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BEYOND THE NUMBERS: SUBSTANTIVE GENDER
DIVERSITY IN BOARDROOMS
YARON NILI*
The push for gender diversity on public companies’ boards has been gaining
traction. Advocacy groups, institutional investors, regulators, and companies
themselves have all recognized the need for more diverse boards. However, gender
parity is still absent from most public companies’ boards, and a significant number
of companies still have no women on their boards.
Current public and academic discourse has focused on the number of women
serving on the board and their percentage compared to men as the litmus test for
gender diversity. However, academic studies and the public push for more diversity
have mostly failed to account for another important measure of board gender
diversity—the actual role and clout that female directors have within the boardroom.
This is what the Article terms as substantive gender diversity.
Substantive gender diversity matters. It is at the core of both the social cause and
the business case for gender diversity on boards. This Article explores this
substantive component of board gender diversity through empirical data relating to
the roles that men and women play on corporate boards. The Article finds
statistically significant differences between the roles of female and male directors.
Building on these findings, the Article asserts that regulators, investors, and
companies must focus not only on increasing the number of women on boards but
also on ensuring that female directors enjoy similar parity once elected. The Article
then proposes a shift towards a Substantive Gender Diversity Disclosure regime
which would measure and report the substantive aspect of gender diversity in
boardrooms.
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INTRODUCTION
She appeared in the middle of the night on the eve of International Women’s Day
2017.1 Staring defiantly at one of the most iconic symbols of corporate America in

1. ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue Stares Down Wall Street’s Bull, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 8, 2017,
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Manhattan, the Fearless Girl statue by Kristen Visbal is a symbol of the increased
attention by investors and the public to the lack of gender diversity within corporate
boardrooms in the United States.2 Though the statue’s location was temporary,3 State
Street Global Advisors, who commissioned the statue, took a more long-lasting step
towards promoting board diversity by voting against 400 corporate boards with no
female directors.4 While the $2.47 trillion asset manager will not require a female
director quota, companies must now show concrete attempts to remedy their
nominating procedures to encourage female nominees in order to avoid a negative
vote.5 This resolute act mirrors what has steadily become a new focus for boardrooms
and investors: gender diversity.
Calls for increased gender diversity in boardrooms are not new,6 but the effort to
achieve better gender parity has come to the forefront of corporate governance
discourse in recent years. On the heels of mandatory quotas for female directors in
many European countries,7 and with increasing evidence suggesting that boardroom
diversity increases company performance,8 the push for diversity has gained traction

11:07 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/nation/2017/03/08/fearless-girl-wall
-street/98898896 [https://perma.cc/MWM8-7AAC].
2. Peter A. Szekely, On Women’s Day Eve, Statute of Girl Stares Down Wall Street
Bull, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2017, 2:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-womens-day-usa
-idUSKBN16E2M8 [https://perma.cc/6DUE-V9S4].
3. Beth Healy, State Street Global Advisors Presses Companies It Invests in to Add
Women to Boards, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com
/business/2017/03/07/state-street-global-advisors-presses-companies-invests-add-womenboards/cE1LWXt6tK7DfveYnIFmpJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/6DUE-V9S4]; Liz Moyer,
‘Fearless Girl’ Will Be Moving to NYSE After Spending a Year Staring Down ‘Charging Bull’,
CNBC (Apr. 19, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/19/fearless-girl-moving
-to-nyse-after-spending-a-year-staring-down-charging-bull.html
[https://perma.cc/AW9C
-AR6R].
4. Justin Baer, State Street Votes Against 400 Companies Citing Gender Diversity,
WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2017, 8:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/state-street-votes
-against-400-companies-citing-gender-diversity-1501029490 [https://perma.cc/E2F9-AP6P].
5. Joann S. Lublin & Sarah Krouse, State Street to Start Voting Against Companies that
Don’t Have Women Directors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/state-street-says-it-will-start-voting-against-companies-that-dont-have-women
-directors-1488862863 [https://perma.cc/G2UV-M6W8].
6. See, e.g., ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (2d ed.
1993); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios
and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 966 (1977) (arguing in 1977 for critical
mass theory and the need for boards to have at least thirty-five percent of directors be female
to introduce new perspectives and increase corporate performance).
7. Douglas M. Branson, Initiatives to Place Women on Corporate Boards of Directors–
A Global Snapshot, 37 J. CORP. L. 793, 803 (2012); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENDER
BALANCE ON CORPORATE BOARDS: EUROPE IS CRACKING THE GLASS CEILING (Mar. 2014),
https://www.genderportal.eu/sites/default/files/resource_pool/FS-WOB-FINAL-EN
-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DPD-YXQ9].
8. LOIS JOY, NANCY M. CARTER, HARVEY M. WAGNER & SRIRAM NARAYANAN,
CATALYST, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION
ON BOARDS (2007), https://www.catalyst.org/system/files/The_Bottom_Line_Corporate
_Performance_and_Womens_Representation_on_Boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/45NP-WQDP].
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within the investor community.9 In addition to State Street, Vanguard and BlackRock
have also taken public steps to promote and advocate for greater board diversity.10
Even more recently, the New York City Comptroller and the New York City Pension
Funds launched their own initiative focusing on board diversity disclosure,11 and
Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) and Glass Lewis, the two largest and
most influential proxy advisory firms, have announced a new focus on gender
diversity.12
Congress is also becoming more involved in the efforts to improve board
diversity. In May 2017, Representatives Carolyn B. Maloney and Donald S. Beyer
sent a letter to newly confirmed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair
Jay Clayton urging him to take action on women’s underrepresentation on corporate
boards, with the accompanying press release stating that “[t]he SEC has the
opportunity and ability to enforce the transparency that is critical to securing gender
balanced corporate leadership. Boardrooms with gender parity lead stronger, healthier
companies, return more to their shareholders, and help our economy grow.”13
According to a recent study, companies with the highest percentage of women on
their boards had a rate of return nearly fifty-three percent higher than companies with
the lowest percentage of female board members. 14 Indeed, while the social duty to
promote equality remains paramount to diversity initiatives, the emerging empirical

9. Healy, supra note 3.
10. See, e.g., Emily Chasan, BlackRock Puts Its Votes Behind Proposals to Get Women
on Boards, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2017, 8:02 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2017-07-14/blackrock-puts-its-votes-behind-proposals-to-get-women-on-boards
[https://
perma.cc/64V2-T7P5]; Ryan Vlastelica, Vanguard Calls for More Diverse Corporate Boards,
Better Climate-Change Disclosures, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 1, 2017, 7:37 AM), https://www
.marketwatch.com/story/vanguard-calls-for-more-diverse-corporate-boards-better-climate
-change-disclosures-2017-08-31 [https://perma.cc/22QU-875L].
11. Abe M. Friedman, Erica K. Lukoski, Bob McCormick & Eric Sumberg, NYC Pension
Funds Boardroom Accountability Project Version 2.0, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/19/nyc-pension-funds
-boardroom-accountability-project-version-2-0 [https://perma.cc/6X9K-KAPQ].
12. Press Release, ISS, ISS Announces 2018 Benchmark Policy Updates (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.issgovernance.com/iss-announces-2018-benchmark-policy-updates
[https://
perma.cc/AQ5G-XSWN] (adopting a new policy on board gender diversity in Canada);
Dimitri Zagoroff, Policy Guidelines Updated: United States, Canada, Shareholder Initiatives
GLASS LEWIS (Nov. 22, 2017), http://www.glasslewis.com/policy-guidelines-updated-united
-states-canada-shareholder-initiatives [https://perma.cc/3M8D-LZS4] (stating that the
company’s 2018 guidelines will feature an increased discussion of board gender diversity in
its reports, including a phased policy that will see nomination committee chairs targeted with
against/withhold recommendations if boards do not include a female director or provide a
cogent explanation for their absence, by 2019).
13. Letter from Carolyn B. Maloney & Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Members of Congress, to
Jay Clayton, Chair, SEC (May 30, 2017), https://maloney.house.gov/sites/maloney
.house.gov/files/Maloney%20Beyer%20Ltr%20Clayton%205.30.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6MSU-DLYS]; Press Release, Carolyn B. Maloney, Reps. Maloney and Beyer Press New
SEC Chairman to Act on Boardroom Diversity (May 30, 2017), https://maloney.house
.gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-maloney-and-beyer-press-new-sec-chairman-to-act
-on-boardroom [https://perma.cc/QG5A-XF4U].
14. JOY ET AL., supra note 8.
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evidence suggesting better rates of return with more diverse boardrooms has
transformed the public discourse in a profound way. Diversity is no longer just a
desirable social cause, advocated for by advocacy groups and third-sector actors;15 it
is now also a matter of better corporate governance and thus can enjoy, and harness,
the support of the investor community—in particular large institutional investors. 16
Yet, even with the recent pressure from legislatures and investors, as of 2017,
women comprised merely 16.2% of corporate boards.17 Many companies still have
no female directors on their board,18 with some companies failing to have had any
female directors over the past decade.19
The lack of gender diversity in boardrooms is further exacerbated by the lack of
sufficient turnover at the board level.20 With very few board seats opening to new
directors each year,21 improving diversity becomes increasingly difficult. However,
boards and investors are intent on addressing this concern. Existing trends towards
board refreshment, as part of the growing emphasis on director independence, will
certainly present boards with more opportunities to appoint new female directors in
an effort to improve gender diversity in the boardroom. 22 Indeed, women and
minorities accounted for half of the 397 newest independent directors at S&P 500
companies in 2017.23

15. See Lublin & Krouse, supra note 5.
16. Anthony Goodman & Rusty O’Kelley, Institutional Investors Lead Push for GenderDiverse Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/26/institutional-investors-lead-push-for-gender-diverse
-boards [https://perma.cc/43TH-CFFY]. A recent ISS survey found that more than two-thirds
(sixty-nine percent) of investor respondents consider it problematic if there are zero female
directors on a public company board. ISS, supra note 12.
17. DAN MARCEC, EQUILAR, EQUILAR GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX: Q3 2017 (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.equilar.com/reports/52-gender-diversity-index-q3-2017 [https://perma.cc/8FZK
-WQ3T] (providing data for the Russell 3000 index); Joann S. Lublin, Dozens of Boards
Excluded Women for Years, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:03 AM), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-boards-excluded-women-for-years-1482847381 [https://perma
.cc/LF62-LVPW] (providing similar statistics for the Fortune 1000 companies).
18. Anders Keitz, Five S&P 500 Boards Have No Women as Gender Balance Growth
Stalls, YAHOO! FINANCE (June 26, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/five-p-500-boardsno-161700143.html [https://perma.cc/2FMK-QMCL]; Lublin, supra note 17; Quick Take:
Women on Corporate Boards Globally, CATALYST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www
.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-corporate-boards-globally [https://perma.cc/3EW9-C5EL].
19. Lublin, supra note 17.
20. See AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW,
GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 44 (2015) (describing the refreshment problem); N.Y. STOCK
EXCH., NYSE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDE, at iv (Steven A. Rosenblum et al. eds., 2014).
21. SPENCER STUART, 2017 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX SURVEY (2017),
https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/ssbi-2017-perspective [https://perma.cc
/X6EX-3BWW] (noting that board turnover remains low and hinders meaningful progress in
the percentage of women and minorities in boardrooms).
22. Id.
23. Id. According to a recent survey released by Spencer Stuart of 397 independent
director slots open in the 2017 proxy season, 36% went to women. See SPENCER STUART supra
note 21; see also Jeff Green, Women and Minorities Are the Majority of New Board Seats for
the First Time, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
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Still, these opportunities must be utilized appropriately and advance meaningful
gender diversity and equality in the boardroom. The now-infamous incident at Uber,
when David Bonderman, the cofounder of the acclaimed private equity firm TPG,
said that more women on the board means “more talking,”24 points to a larger
concern: do women get a fair and equal chance to contribute? Indeed, when it comes
to gender diversity in corporate boardrooms, numbers matter, but so do the specific
roles that women take on while on the board.
As this Article argues and empirically demonstrates, there is a fundamental
difference between solely meeting numerical diversity “targets” and achieving true
diversity in the boardroom. Therefore, investors and advocates of gender diversity
must not only account for the ratio of gender-diverse directors in the boardroom.
They must also account for the roles and functions that these directors serve once
elected to the board—what in other contexts is often termed as substantive equality.25
Contemporary academic discourse on the topic of gender diversity on boards can
be divided into three main strands. First, there are studies that survey the current
landscape of board gender diversity. 26 These studies examine the number of women
currently filling board directorships as well as historical trends related to gender
diversity.27 A second strand examines the impact of gender diversity on the financial
performance of a company, attempting to determine whether boards that are more
diverse improve performance or other observable characteristics of companies.28
Finally, a third strand centers on the social understanding of board diversity, asking
how gender effects board dynamics and operation. 29 Taken together, many of these

/articles/2017-12-06/women-minorities-capture-most-new-board-seats-for-first-time [https://
perma.cc/PM9A-Y84Y].
24. Mike Isaac & Susan Chira, David Bonderman Resigns from Uber Board After Sexist
Remark, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/uber
-sexual-harassment-huffington-bonderman.html [https://perma.cc/7V6Z-DCNH].
25. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, Foreword: Conceptualizing Substantive Justice, 13 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 533 (2010); Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal
Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1687 (1986).
26. See, e.g., DELOITTE, WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (4th ed.
2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg
-women-in-the-boardroom-a-global-perspective4.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4Q7-HTUT]; BORIS
GROYSBERG, YO-JUD CHENG & DEBORAH BELL, SPENCER STUART &
WOMENCORPORATEDIRECTORS FOUNDATION, 2016 GLOBAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS SURVEY
(2016),
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.womencorporatedirectors.com/resource/resmgr
/Knowledge_Bank/WCDBoardSurvey2016_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/47RN-Z83U]; JOY
ET AL., supra note 8.
27. DELOITTE, supra note 26; GROYSBERG ET AL., supra note 26; JOY ET AL., supra note 8.
28. See, e.g., Jasmin Joecks, Kerstin Pull & Karin Vetter, Gender Diversity in the
Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?”, 118 J. BUS.
ETHICS 61 (2012); Joana Marinova, Janneke Plantenga & Chantal Remery, Gender Diversity
& Firm Performance: Evidence from Dutch and Danish Boardrooms, 27 INT’L J. HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. 1777 (2016).
29. See, e.g., Nada K. Kakabadse, Catarina Figueira, Katerina Nicolopoulou, Jessica
Hong Yang, Andrew P. Kakabadse & Mustafa F. Özbilgin, Gender Diversity and Board
Performance: Women’s Experiences and Perspectives, 54 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 265
(2015).
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studies ultimately conclude that either economic or moral forces (or both) support
the push for increasing board diversity.30
Until this point, however, current academic discourse has had a dearth of
empirical data dissecting the specific roles of women once they are elected to serve
on a board and contrasting them with their peer male directors.31 For instance,
information is still lacking concerning important questions such as: what board
committees do women tend to sit on;32 do they hold similar leadership roles; what is
their tenure compared to their male counterparts; and what industries have higher
percentages of female participation? Such details help reveal whether the
metaphorical glass ceiling is truly broken for an individual woman once she enters a
boardroom or whether female directors are still subject to disparities even while
serving as directors.
The answer to this question is central to gender diversity discourse. As this Article
demonstrates,33 substantive gender diversity on boards matters. It matters if you
believe in gender diversity on boards as part of a social cause. It also matters if you
believe that gender-diverse boards lead to better company performance.
This Article is the first to examine this question in detail and to provide data on
both an absolute as well as relative level of female participation in the boardroom.

30. See DELOITTE, supra note 26; GROYSBERG ET AL., supra note 26; JOY ET AL., supra
note 8; Joecks et al., supra note 28; Marinova et al., supra note 28; see also Vathunyoo Sila,
Angelica Gonzalez & Jens Hagendorf, Women on Board: Does Boardroom Gender Diversity
Really Affect Firm Risk?, 36 J. CORP. FIN. 26 (2016) (finding a negative relationship between
gender diversity and equity risk); Silva Del Prete & Maria Lucia Stefani, Women as ‘Gold
Dust’: Gender Diversity in Top Boards and the Performance of Italian Banks, (Banca D’Italia,
Working Paper No. 1014, 2015), https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-discussione
/2015/2015-1014/en_tema_1014.pdf?language_id=1
[https://perma.cc/KS97-WGUY]
(finding increased women on Italian bank boards has a positive effect on both the quality of
credit and bank profitability); Marcus Noland, Tyler Moran & Barbara Kotschwar, Is Gender
Diversity Profitable? Evidence from a Global Survey, (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working
Paper No. 16-3, 2016), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/wp16-3.pdf [https://perma
.cc/E2GA-5AVC] (finding data from more than ninety-one countries suggests the presence of
women in the boardroom or upper management improves a company’s financial performance).
31. There are three earlier studies that have charted limited (and now dated) data
regarding committee roles of women, but without contrasting the data to men or controlling
for the women ratio on the board. See Dan R. Dalton & Catherine M. Dalton, Women and
Corporate Boards of Directors: The Promise of Increased, and Substantive, Participation in
the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 257 (2010); Idalene F. Kesner, Directors’
Characteristics and Committee Membership: An Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure,
and Gender, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 66 (1988); Craig A. Peterson & James Philpot, Women’s
Roles on U.S. Fortune 500 Boards: Director Expertise and Committee Memberships, 72 J.
BUS. ETHICS 177 (2007). A more recent study has focused on women’s committee work in
relation to their compensation. See Laura Casares Field, Matthew E. Souther & Adam S. Yore,
Does Diversity Pay in the Boardroom? (2d Annual Fin. Insts., Regulation & Corp. Governance
Conference) (Mar. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810543 [https://perma.cc/74P5-J3QK].
32. Board committee service correlates with the ability of directors to exert influence on
corporate policy. See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Section I.D (discussing the importance of substantive gender diversity to
both strands of justifications for gender diversity on boards).
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The Article, for the years 2007 to 2015, examines the ratio of women on boards
within the S&P 1500 companies, their board leadership roles, whether these women
would be classified as “busy” or “overboarded directors,”34 the length of their tenure,
and their likelihood of key board committee participation. Additionally, these
numbers are compared with similar metrics for their male counterparts.
The empirical findings reveal significant differences between male and female
directors, extending from their tenure to the roles they hold while on the board.
Women have shorter tenures, are less likely to hold leadership roles, and are stretched
more thinly than their male counterparts.35 These previously underexplored
differences highlight that in addition to the highly addressed quantitative gender
disparity on U.S. boards lies an equally concerning substantive gender disparity36
that has yet to be addressed. Accordingly, current calls for board diversity and the
current disclosure regime must internalize the lessons these new empirical data
present. Gender diversity discourse, therefore, must look beyond the numbers of
female directors on the board and account for the roles that these directors take once
appointed.
Underscoring the fact that current disclosure practices of companies do little to
provide investors with information regarding the board’s gender diversity, the Article
then brings together these two strands—the importance of substantive gender
diversity and the deficiencies in the current disclosure regime—by calling for a shift
towards an enhanced disclosure regime. Specifically, the Article advocates for the
SEC to require companies to provide investors with both substantive and quantitative
measures of gender diversity on the boardroom through the adoption of a Substantive
Gender Diversity Disclosure (SGDD) form.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the importance of gender diversity
in the boardroom, the different justifications for improving gender diversity, and the
importance of substantive gender diversity to these justifications. Part II provides the
results of the empirical analysis and an interpretation of the findings. Part III

34. Busy directors are directors who participate on multiple boards and therefore may be
“too busy” engaging in their various director activities. See, e.g., ISS, 2016 BENCHMARK
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.issgovernance.com/file
/policy/2016-americas-policy-updates.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZLE-4M9R] (summarizing
academic research defining “busy” as a director who serves on three or more boards).
Overboarded directors are similarly defined as directors who sit on too many boards. See ISS,
UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 12 (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.issgovernance
.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3Z4-QJ29].
ISS indicated it would vote against a director sitting on more than five public company boards
or if a CEO, on more than one additional board. Id.
35. These results confirm earlier observations regarding increased committee work for
women. See, e.g., Pornsit Jiraporn, Manohar Singh & Chun I. Lee, Ineffective Corporate
Governance: Director Busyness and Board Committee Memberships, 33 J. BANKING & FIN.
819 (2009).
36. This Article uses the term “substantive gender diversity” in a manner that varies from
the usage of “substantive equality” in the literature in other contexts, in particular the
antidiscrimination literature. Specifically, in this Article the term “substantive gender
diversity” is focused on ensuring gender inclusion beyond the numerical ratio of women.
Broad discussion of substantive equality as defined in the antidiscrimination literature is
beyond the Article’s scope. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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discusses the current regulatory framework and its flaws, and Part IV discusses the
policy implications, advancing a call for an improved gender diversity disclosure
regime.
I. GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE BOARDROOM—WHAT’S AT STAKE
A. The Board of Directors’ Important Role in
the Governance of the Corporation
Gender diversity in the boardroom is of particular interest due to the important
role of boards in modern U.S. corporate governance.
As the core organ of the modern corporation, the board is tasked with several
important roles in the governance of the corporation. 37 First, while most of the
operational decision-making can be, and is, delegated to management, the board is
still required to be an active participant in some of the more important managerial
business decisions, such as mergers, stock issuance, and change of company
governance documents.38 Second, the board is a resource for management to utilize.
The board provides insight and advice, as well as networking benefits, and facilitates
the firm’s access to various resources. 39
Third, the board is charged with a monitoring role.40 The dispersed ownership
structure of U.S. publicly held corporations41 presents a severe agency cost between
management and shareholders.42 Shareholders’ lack of incentive to supervise
management due to their dispersed ownership, coupled with free riding concerns,
effectively leads to a managerial controlled corporate structure. One of the first
institutions asked to mitigate this agency issue was the board of directors.43 The
board is expected to represent shareholders’ interest vis-à-vis management,44
curtailing management’s ability to extract private benefits or act in a suboptimal way
with respect to shareholder interests. 45 While the recent rise in shareholder activism

37. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern
Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 376 (1975).
38. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
45–46 (2012).
39. See id. at 45–47.
40. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 155–67 (2008) (detailing the role of the board monitoring management); JONATHAN
R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 50 (2008) (listing
major corporate governance mechanisms for U.S. public companies); Jill E. Fisch, Taking
Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268–72 (1997).
41. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 7 (rev. ed. 1991).
42. Agency cost can be defined as the “costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set
of contracts among agents with conflicting interests.” Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301, 304 (1983).
43. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 19502005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468–69 (2007).
44. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 40, 155–57 (detailing the role of the board and its
importance in the governance of the firm).
45. See Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board
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by hedge funds46 and the rise in institutional investors’ engagement with companies47
have given shareholders a better ability to counteract these monitoring concerns, the
board has taken an even greater role in the engagement with shareholders.48 The
board, therefore, has become a conduit, allowing investors to formally and informally
engage with the company.49
Importantly, while boards meet regularly, often eight to twelve times a year, 50
many important board decisions are delegated to specific board committees, which
are tasked with a particular mandate. Board committees meet separately from the full
board, are composed of subsets of board members, and tend to have specific,
narrowly defined functions. 51 While boards may have various committees, there are
several key committees that all publicly traded companies must maintain 52 and that
are often cited as having the greatest influence on corporate governance. 53 These key

Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 583–84 (2010) (focusing on the boards’ broader duties
in the context of a controlling shareholder); see also Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation
as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 129–35 (2008) (describing directors’ fiduciary
duty to adopt shareholders’ ends).
46. See, e.g., Matthew R. Denes, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Victoria B. McWilliams, Thirty
Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405 (2017)
(summarizing and synthesizing the findings from seventy-three studies that examine the
effects of shareholder activism); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of
Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN 55 (2007); Jim Rossman,
Chris Couvelier & Kashyap Shah, Review of Shareholder Activism: 1H 2018, HARV. L. SCH.
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 30, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018
/07/30/review-of-shareholder-activism-1h-2018 [https://perma.cc/W8WU-N4T7].
47. Paula Loop, Catherine Bromilow & Leah Malone, The Changing Face of Shareholder
Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://corpgov
.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/01/the-changing-face-of-shareholder-activism
[https://perma.cc
/L6WG-MRJY].
48. See Krystal Gaboury Berrini & Rob Zivnuska, Board Lessons: Succeeding with
Investors in a Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 5, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/05/board-lessons-succeeding-with-investors-in-a
-crisis [https://perma.cc/8Y3P-GMSW].
49. See Martin Lipton, Spotlight on Boards 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (May 31, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/31/spotlight-on
-boards-2018 [https://perma.cc/5EN2-SZ4L].
50. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 21 (stating that in 2017 boards met an average of
8.2 times).
51. See Eileen Morgan Johnson, The Basics of Board Committee Structure, ASAE (Dec.
21, 2015), https://www.asaecenter.org/resources/articles/an_plus/2015/december/the-basics
-of-board-committee-structure [https://perma.cc/RSR6-6TAQ].
52. See Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 97, 109–10 (2016); see also SPENCER STUART, supra note 21.
53. Idalene F. Kesner, Directors’ Characteristics and Committee Membership: An
Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure, and Gender, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 66, 67–68 (1988);
see also David A. Carter, Frank D’Souza, Betty J. Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, The Gender
and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance,
18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 396, 400–01 (2010); April Klein, Firm Performance and
Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 277–80 (1998).
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committees are the audit committee, 54 the nominating committee,55 the corporate
governance committee,56 and the compensation committee.57 Research has shown
that directors have a stronger, more direct impact on executive compensation, new
director selection, and other important board actions if they serve on board
committees that are tasked with the primary responsibility for these functions. 58
Consequently, accounting for a director’s specific board committee membership
provides a more accurate picture of the director’s role on the board.
B. Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards
The board’s importance as a corporate organ has led to increased scrutiny
regarding its composition and structure.59 In recent years, board gender diversity has
become one of the biggest issues looming over corporate boardrooms, with some
dubbing board composition as “the” issue of 2017.60 With State Street, Vanguard,
and Blackrock voicing their commitment to this issue,61 it is not surprising that in

54. The audit committee is charged with ensuring the quality and integrity of the
company’s financial statements and regulatory compliance. Under NYSE listing rules, the
committee must be comprised solely of independent directors. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Section
303A.07 Audit Committee Additional Requirements, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL (Aug.
22, 2013), http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4
_3_8&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/L77T-PBCT].
55. The nominating committee is in charge of nominating director candidates and often
also selects new CEOs and peer directors to the other board committees. See Joseph V.
Carcello, Terry L. Neal, Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, CEO Involvement in Selecting
Board Members, Audit Committee Effectiveness, and Restatements, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES.
396, 397–401 (2011).
56. The corporate governance committee is responsible for assisting a corporate board in
matters related to the corporation’s governance structure. DIRTT ENVTL. SOLS., CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER 2 (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.dirtt.net/assets
/attachments/59cdebe4e1/DIRTT-GovernanceCommittee-Jan18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZU9
-BZCH].
57. The compensation committee is tasked with setting the compensation of senior
executives and generally oversees the corporation’s compensation policies. Under NYSE
listing rules the committee must be comprised solely of independent directors. See N.Y. Stock
Exch., Section 303A.05 Compensation Committee, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL (Jan. 11,
2013), http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3
_6&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/VD5A-BJRE].
58. See Klein, supra note 53, at 279–80.
59. See, e.g., Marc S. Gerber, US Corporate Governance: Boards of Directors Face
Increased Scrutiny, SKADDEN (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/insights
/publications/2014/01/us-corporate-governance-boards-of-directors-face-i [https://perma.cc
/WNN5-2QSM]; Robert Hauswald & Robert Marquez, Governance Mechanisms, Corporate
Disclosure, and the Role of Technology 1–2 (Mar. 22, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687138 [https://perma.cc/7YQJ-SGFM].
60. Paula Loop, A Look at Board Composition: How Does Your Industry Stack Up?,
HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard
.edu/2017/03/06/a-look-at-board-composition-how-does-your-industry-stack-up
[https://
perma.cc/53UW-DCDLa].
61. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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2017 the number of board diversity proposals reached an all-time high.62 These
proposals are also gaining stronger support from investors, with many large
institutions voting in favor of such proposals. 63 Proxy advisors have also shown
support for the issue. ISS Analytics, a leading shareholder advisory firm,
recommended that shareholders vote “for” all but two of the diversity proposals
voted on in 2017.64 Furthermore, diversity proposals that were voted on received, on
average, 28.3% of votes cast, which is a strong level of support in the context of
social responsibility proposals.65 Moreover, the support level for diversity proposals
has increased significantly, compared to 2016 where only 19.1% of votes cast
supported these resolutions, with 28.3% of such proposals in 2017 receiving majority
support and many more that settled prior to a vote.66
Most of these proposals requested that the board increase the diversity of its
candidate pools, provide reports on actions taken by the board to increase diversity,
or both.67 Additionally, the California State Teachers Retirement System

62. See Ronald O. Mueller & Elizabeth Ising, Shareholder Proposal Developments
During the 2017 Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 12,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/12/shareholder-proposal-developments
-during-the-2017-proxy-season [https://perma.cc/F2NJ-QGGF] (“Thirty-five proposals
calling for the adoption of a policy on board diversity or a report on steps to increase board
diversity were submitted in 2017 as compared to 28 proposals submitted in 2016. As in 2016,
a substantial number of board diversity proposals were withdrawn, likely due to commitments
made by companies to the proponents of these proposals, such as adopting board recruitment
policies inclusive of race and/or gender.”); see also Jeff Green & Emily Chasan, Investors
Push Corporate Boards to Add Women, People of Color, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:49
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-02/shareholders-target-pale-male
-and-stale-corporate-boards [https://perma.cc/YC27-9GEV] (noting that according to ISS
Analytics, 2017 shareholder proposals regarding diversity are on pace to meet or exceed the
number of similar proposals from 2016).
63. For example, on April 27, 2017, a shareholder proposal to add women and minorities
to the board at Cognex Corp. received 62.8% support with major institutional investors voting
in favor. Among the supporters were Allianz, AXA Investment Managers, Florida State Board
of Administration, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, Vanguard, BNY Mellon, and T. Row
Price Associates COGNEX CORPORATION: PROPOSAL SUMMARY, PROXY INSIGHT (2017).
64. Mueller & Ising, supra note 62 (noting that according to ISS Analytics, 2017
shareholder proposals regarding diversity are on pace to meet or exceed the number of similar
proposals from 2016).
65. Id. Most shareholder proposals regarding social aspects get less than one-third of the
votes with many barely crossing the 10% support level. Therefore, close to 30% support level
is in fact large, and many companies, once such proposals receive these levels of support,
further engage with shareholders to achieve a negotiated agreement. See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron
Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors Apathy, 41
DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 77–78 (2016) (discussing the 30% support level and company engagement
with shareholders).
66. Mueller & Ising, supra note 62; see also David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh,
Corporate Governance Update: Prioritizing Board Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/30
/corporate-governance-update-prioritizing-board-diversity [https://perma.cc/EH3F-RVCY].
67. Green & Chasan, supra note 62; Arthur H. Kohn, Elizabeth K. Bieber & Maria I.
Maldonado, Board Diversity Developments, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
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(“CalSTRS”) submitted letters to 125 California corporations without female
directors strongly suggesting the inclusion of women on the board.68 Subsequently,
thirty-five of these boards added at least one female to their boards.69
Yet, while 86% of directors participating in PwC’s annual director survey stated
they felt that women should comprise between 21% and 50% of the board,70 only
28% of Russell 3000 boards have more than one-fifth of their board comprised of
women.71 Indeed, as of October 2017, on average, women comprise 16.2% of Russell
3000 boards.72 The outlook is slightly better at the larger companies where women
represent 20.8% of directors on Fortune 1000 boards.73
Further, some boards in the United States have failed to even attempt to promote
gender diversity.74 A recent report noted that of the 1500 largest Russell 3000
companies, seventy-six companies failed to have any female directors over the past
decade.75 An additional thirteen companies added a female director for the first time
in 2016.76
At this current rate, projections show that corporate boards will not reach gender
parity until 2055.77 In reaction to this slow growth, groups such as the Thirty Percent
Coalition78 and 2020 Women on Boards have organized in an attempt to increase
female board participation at an even quicker rate.79 These organizations seek to

(Aug. 21, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/21/board-diversity-developments
[https://perma.cc/6GDZ-6MFW]. See generally RAJEEV KUMAR, GEORGESON, 2016 ANNUAL
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2016), https://www.georgeson.com/us/Documents/acgr
/acgr2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KPL-2BCA]. Though influential institutional investors such
as the California Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”) strongly support such
proposals, some fund managers prefer to vote against such proposals and engage directly with
the board. See, e.g., Green & Chasan, supra note 62.
68. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 66.
69. Id.
70. PWC, PWC’S 2016 ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY 6 (Oct. 2016), https://
www.pwc.com/us/en/governance-insights-center/annual-corporate-directors-survey/assets
/pwc-2016-annual-corporate--directors--survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4RM-FRXC].
71. MARCEC, supra note 17.
72. See id.
73. 2020 WOMEN ON BDS., GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX: 2011–2017 PROGRESS OF WOMEN
CORPORATE BOARD DIRECTORS BY COMPANY, SIZE, STATE AND SECTOR 1 (2017),
https://www.2020wob.com/sites/default/files/2020WOB_GDI_Report_2017_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7R3-BRA4].
74. See Lublin, supra note 17.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Green & Chasan, supra note 62.
78. “The mission of the Thirty Percent Coalition is to promote gender diversity, including
women of color, on corporate boards. . . . [F]ollowing the Coalition’s Institutional Investors’
initiatives more than more than [sic] 180 companies have appointed a woman to their boards
and, in many instances, a woman of color. The Coalition’s investors represent more than $3.5
trillion in assets under management and continue to have a major impact.” THIRTY PERCENT
COALITION, https://www.30percentcoalition.org [https://perma.cc/6N86-FU2F].
79. The organization 2020 Women on Boards seeks to make all boards composed of at
least twenty percent women by the year 2020. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, https://www
.2020wob.com [https://perma.cc/KV6Q-LGHJ].

158

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:145

refocus the criteria considered for directorships to increase the number of women
considered for these positions.80
One of the key hurdles to improving diversity is the low turnover of directors. If
companies appoint new directors infrequently, the ability to increase the gender
diversity of the board is significantly reduced.81 Aside from the refreshment problem,
lack of leadership experience is often cited as one of the main barriers to increased
gender diversity in the boardroom. 82 Because women, as well as minorities, have yet
to hold leadership positions within corporate America on the same scale and level as
white men, this prerequisite for nomination limits the number of diverse candidates. 83
Because many companies seek operational and executive experience in their
board nominees in order to raise investor confidence in the board, the
underrepresentation of female executives in corporate America also limits the
opportunities available to women to serve as directors. 84 However, the limited pool
argument does not seem to explain the current disparities. 85 Further building on the
issue is the limited ability to network or add meaningful director experience for
women.86 As this Article will later develop, a majority of directors serve on multiple
boards. Whether due to the same nomination criteria, the ability to network within
boards, or the additional qualification of prior experience, the limited number of
upper-management positions held by women severely limits the growth in gender
diversity within the boardroom.
C. The Two-Headed Case for Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards
Why does gender diversity in boardrooms matter, and what are the justifications
supporting investors and regulators’ push for a change in board composition? These
questions are at the core of the gender diversity debate. Broadly, the push for gender

80. See How To Find Qualified Women to Serve on Corporate Boards, 2020 WOMEN ON
BOARDS,
https://www.2020wob.com/learn/how-find-qualified-women-serve-corporate
-boards [https://perma.cc/BB86-4RM8]; Who We Are, THIRTY PERCENT COALITION,
https://www.30percentcoalition.org/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/V6FJ-7P9W].
81. See, e.g., DHIR, supra note 20, at 44; Nili, supra note 52, at 139.
82. Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much
Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 402 (2014); see also DHIR, supra
note 20, at 38–46.
83. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and
Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 599–601 (2006) [hereinafter
Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline].
84. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 40 (stating the “CEO experience has become ‘a quick
litmus test for qualified board candidates’” (internal citation omitted)).
85. See Amanda K. Packel, Government Intervention into Board Composition: Gender
Quotas in Norway and Diversity Disclosures in the United States, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
192, 198–200 (2016) (reviewing AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY:
CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY (2015)).
86. A 2012 study of 1000 directors from fifty-eight countries found that while men tend
to attribute lack of diversity to a “small pool” argument, women mostly attributed it to the
male network argument. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, 2012 BOARD OF DIRECTORS SURVEY 3
(2012).
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diversity on boards rests on two distinct pillars. The first is grounded in social cause.
The second makes an instrumental case for gender diversity.
1. The Social Cause Case for Gender Diversity
The social cause case for gender diversity is rooted in the larger gender equality,
antidiscrimination, and feminist movement of the 1960s. 87 Gender diversity on
boards provides equal opportunity to women who historically were excluded from
positions of power. Advocates of board gender diversity—like advocates of gender
equality in other sectors—therefore rely on moral or social justifications in their push
for gender diversity on the board.
Their case is premised on the intrinsic notion that increasing diversity is the “right
thing to do,”88 predominantly because the efforts to improve diversity are aimed at
correcting the lingering effects of discrimination.89 “There is a strong public interest
in ensuring that opportunities are available to all, . . . that women entering the labo[]r
market are able to fulfil their potential, and that we make full use of the wealth of
talented women” available for board service.90
Accordingly, some scholars argue that the rationale for improving diversity
should reside in the justifications related to social benefits and duties.91 That is, social
justice, equal opportunity, and corporate reputation should be enough to promote
gender diversity within the board.92 Indeed, this social argument seems to carry some
weight even within boards themselves.93 However, historically, advocacy efforts
based solely on moral and social justice justifications have mostly failed to gain much
traction with Main and Wall Street investors, leaving boards free to maintain their
male-dominated composition.94

87. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 58; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the
Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated
with Women of Color, 79 St. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2005).
88. Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C.
L. REV. 854, 856–57 (2011) [hereinafter Fairfax, Same Old Story].
89. Id.; see also J. Cunyon Gordon, Painting by Numbers: “And, Um, Let’s Have a Black
Lawyer Sit at Our Table”, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1277 (2003) (describing a university
president’s attitude that diversity is just “the right thing to do”); Vance Knapp & Bonnie Kae
Grover, Note, The Corporate Law Firm—Can It Achieve Diversity?, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J.
298, 303 (1993) (“Law firms should hire more minority attorneys, of course, for reasons of
simple justice.”); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is
Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 (2004).
90. HOUSE OF LORDS [H.L.], EUR. UNION COMM., WOMEN ON BOARDS: REPORT 13–14
(Nov. 9, 2012) (U.K.).
91. Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 395–401; see also DHIR, supra note 20, at 64–68.
92. Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 424.
93. As noted in the PwC study, almost eighty-three percent of directors feel that having
females represent more than twenty percent is a good thing both commercially and morally.
Yet, as seen in the same study and in practice, even coupled with the business case for
diversity, the number of women on boards has yet to materialize to these numbers. PWC, supra
note 70, at 6.
94. Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88, at 855–57.
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2. The Instrumental Case for Gender Diversity
In recent years, many gender diversity advocates have shifted the core of their
advocacy from social and moral justifications to a more instrumental case for
diversity.95 This second pillar is focused on the benefits that gender-diverse boards
provide to companies and investors and therefore on the “corporate governance case”
for improving diversity on boards.
Two rationales exist to explain the instrumental value of gender-diverse boards.
The first suggests that groups that are more diverse generally make better decisions.
Studies have shown that a group of high-functioning diverse individuals tends to
outperform a nondiverse group of the best performing individuals. 96 The second
rationale suggests that boards focused on gender diversity within the boardroom are
also more likely to utilize talent pools more effectively and have a better
understanding of the employee and customer bases, and that signaling that the
company cares about diversity may be effective in bolstering economic arguments. 97
The instrumental case for gender diversity encompasses a large spectrum of
benefits. Broadly speaking, it could be divided into two main strands. The first
focuses on corporate performance in its narrow sense—the corporate bottom line.98
The second focuses on performance in the broader sense—the way boards work,
group dynamics, risk taking, accounting integrity, and other less quantifiable
governance measures.99
a. Bottom Line Performance
A growing body of studies has linked gender-diverse boards and improved
corporate performance.100 For example, MSCI conducted a study in 2015 to test the
hypothesis that increased gender diversity within the boardroom correlates with
increased corporate performance for that year.101 This study analyzed companies
with “strong female leadership.”102 In 2016, it conducted a similar study, however,

95. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 58–64; Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88, at 884–
85.
96. See, e.g., Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can
Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
16385, 16389 (2004).
97. See Packel, supra note 85, at 217–18. Importantly, more women in the boardroom is
also associated with more women in senior management positions and below. Similar to
boardroom gender diversity, gender diversity within senior levels of management correlates
with better company performance, and female board member participation may pave the way
for a more gender diverse management. Id.
98. See JOY ET AL., supra note 8.
99. See Packel, supra note 85, at 200–04; see also DHIR, supra note 20, at 58–64; Fairfax,
Same Old Story, supra note 88, at 879–90; Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 393–401.
100. See MEGGIN THWING EASTMAN, DAIMON RALLIS & GAIA MAZZUCCHELL, MSCI, THE
TIPPING POINT: WOMEN ON BOARDS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 6–8 (2016).
101. Id.
102. Id. “Strong female leadership” was categorized as a company having a female CEO
and at least one woman on the board, three or more women on the board, or a higher than
country average percentage of women on the board. Id. at 6 n.6.
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this time analyzing returns over a five-year period and separating companies into
those that reached the “tipping point” of women in the boardroom with those with
no women on the board.103 Thus, the MSCI study attempted to test whether having
this critical mass positively impacted company performance. 104 Both studies returned
the same result: companies with “strong female leadership” enjoyed better rates of
return than their counterparts without a female board director. 105
These recent studies join earlier studies finding a relationship between gender
diversity and performance. 106 Referencing these studies allows gender diversity
supporters to “pitch” their concerns to an otherwise skeptical public. 107
However, the business case in its narrowest sense—a positive effect on
accounting measures or stock price—has yet to definitively establish that gender
diversity is the cause of an increase in the bottom line.108
Linking corporate performance to specific board attributes is inherently difficult,
and therefore it is not surprising that the case for bottom line performance has
produced a mixed bag of empirical results. First, while positive correlations have
been seen with increased gender diversity, researchers acknowledge that “correlation
does not imply causation.”109 For example, the recent MSCI studies failed to

103. Id. at 6–7. The theory behind the “tipping point” is that having three or more similar
“minorities” within a group provides a critical mass to present opposing and additional
viewpoints. Id. By reaching this number, the gender parity on the board is seen as an actual
change as opposed to the mere ability to state that the board itself is diverse. However, the
study does not provide evidence that merely having one or two female directors does not
positively affect corporate performance as well. Id. at 11.
104. See id. at 15.
105. Id. at 3. Companies with “strong female leadership” had a Return on Equity (ROE) of
10.1% whereas companies without female directors had a ROE of 7.4%. Id. at 3. The 2016
five-year study narrowed the focus to U.S. companies, and the results suggested an even more
drastic discrepancy between companies who had reached the “tipping point” of female board
inclusions and those without a female director. The “tipping point” group had a median ROE
of 10% and an Earnings Per Share (EPS) increase over the time period of 37%. Id. The group
devoid of female directors, on the other hand, had a ROE of 1% and an EPS of -8%. Id.
106. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 383–93.
107. See CATALYST, 2007 CENSUS: BOARD DIRECTORS at 1 (2007), https://www
.catalyst.org/system/files/census_board_final.pdf; Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88, at
860–65 (addressing the business rationales for diversity and arguing that diversity advocates
must pay greater attention to the role of social and moral justifications in the effort to diversify
the corporate boardroom); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A CostBenefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 795, 810–38 (2005) (evaluating the different business rationales for board diversity and
the risks they may entail).
108. See Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact
on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 308 (2009) (“Although a positive
relation between gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance is often cited in the
popular press, it is not robust to any of our methods of addressing the endogeneity of gender
diversity.”); Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 383–93 (reviewing the issues with the narrow
business case for diversity and discussing the explanations for the varied results).
109. See, e.g., Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More than a Woman: Insights into
Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 902–03 (2015)
(noting that most studies caution that evidence of a causal relationship is “suggestive rather
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establish a statistically significant causal link between the presence of women and
their performance metrics.110
Second, despite the recent wave of studies supporting a positive correlation
between gender diversity and bottom line performance, other conflicting studies
show that diverse boards fail to truly outperform the market 111 and that there had
been a drop in corporate performance after the initiation of a quota in certain
countries.112 These findings, and the difficulties inherent in linking corporate
performance to specific board attributes, have led some scholars and gender equality
advocates to refocus the instrumental case on corporate performance in its broader
sense.113
b. Board Dynamics and Governance
Empirical evidence on board processes and socio-psychological research on
small-group dynamics have supported the argument that diverse boards are
associated with better decision-making and governance.114 The basic premise of
these arguments is that diversity—whether through representation of different
strengths, consideration of different concerns, or questions based on varying life

than conclusive”); see also VIRTCOM CONSULTING, BOARD DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY:
REALIZING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 4–5 (2009).
110. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 108, at 308 (discussing the lack of a causal link);
EASTMAN ET AL., supra note 100 (discussing the MSCI studies).
111. See VIRTCOM CONSULTING, supra note 109, at 10. The Virtcom Consulting study
shows that over a five-year period, diverse boards outperformed the NASDAQ 100 and the
Dow Jones Industrial Average but failed to outperform the Standard & Poor’s 500. Id. Because
the NASDAQ 100 and Dow Jones incorporate only some of the largest firms, it begs the
question of how to establish the proper benchmark for analyzing gender diversity.
Additionally, it raises the issue of properly segmenting the different types of companies
between diverse and not diverse.
112. See, e.g., Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 109. Albeit this is perhaps due to the
need for boards to dip into younger, less-qualified talent pools for the same number of women.
See Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm
Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 137, 188 (2012).
113. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 64–68; Rhode & Packel supra note 82, at 390–93.
114. See Vicki W. Kramer, Alison M. Konrad & Sumru Erkut, Critical Mass on Corporate
Boards: Why Three or More Women Enhance Governance 8–9 (Wellesley Ctrs. For Women,
Working Paper No. 11, 2006). But cf. SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 324–35 (2007); Lynne
L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1363, 1391 (2002) (explaining that “heterogeneous groups do not necessarily have an
advantage over homogeneous groups when the task is solving problems that have verifiably,
correct answers”); Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate Board Gender Diversity and
Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 809,
814–15 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 111–12 (2000).
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experiences—will counteract groupthink.115 Indeed, there has been a growing body
of evidence that diversity on boards is associated with improved governance. 116
Some legal studies have also attempted to quantify the personal impact of gender
diversity within the boardroom through interviews with former corporate
directors.117 Through these studies, scholars have noted two almost unanimous
observations. First, directors believe that board diversity is important and boards
should attempt to improve diversity. 118 Second, when pressed for tangible examples
of how gender diversity made a difference, respondents struggled to provide
responses.119 These findings further crystalize the difficulty in directly attributing the
benefits of diversity.
Finally, gender diversity can have a positive impact on the monitoring role of the
board.120 According to a study of the Norwegian quota regime, female directors tend
to bring to the boardroom a more vigilant and probing approach, and women “may
be particularly adept at critically questioning, guiding, and advising management
without disrupting the overall working relationship between the board and
management.”121 Similarly, a study of Israeli boards found that “[b]oards with at least
3 directors of each gender are found to be at least 79% more active at board meetings
than those without such representation” and that “[g]ender-balanced boards are also
more likely to replace underperforming chief executive officers (CEOs) and are
particularly active during periods when CEOs are being replaced.”122

115. For example, studies have found evidence that women are more financially risk
averse, more trustworthy, and more collaborative. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 9 (2d ed. 1982)
(defining groupthink as a phenomenon in which members’ efforts to achieve consensus can
override their ability to “realistically appraise alternative courses of action”); see also Marleen
A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306–08
(2003) (discussing how diversity on corporate boards can discourage groupthink).
116. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 393–401; see also Adams & Ferreira, supra
note 108, at 304 (finding that firms with higher proportions of female directors hold more
meetings, have higher attendance rates, greater participation in decision making, engage in
tougher monitoring, and are more likely to replace a CEO after poor stock performance);
Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline, supra note 83, at 589–95; Sandeep Gopalan & Katherine
Watson, An Agency Theoretical Approach to Corporate Board Diversity, 52 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1, 20 (2015) (“Some of the most persuasive evidence about the ability of diverse boards
to improve firm performance concerns the role of the board in monitoring management.”);
Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 109, 927–28.
117. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley & Lissa L. Broome, Diversity and Talent
at the Top: Lessons from the Boardroom, in DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE: RACE, GENDER, AND
CLASS IN LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL CAREERS 81 (Spencer Headworth et al. eds., 2016).
118. However, the study did note one adamant dissenter. Id. at 82.
119. Id.; see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley & Lissa L. Broome, The Danger
of Difference: Tensions in Directors’ View of Corporate Board Diversity, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
919, 920 (2013).
120. DHIR, supra note 20, at 35.
121. Id.
122. Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Gender and Board Activeness: The Role of a Critical Mass, 52
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 751, 751 (2017).
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In sum, moral and social reasons, corporate finance justifications, and corporate
governance findings have all been raised to support the case for more gender
diversity in boards.
D. The Missing Dimension: Substantive Gender Diversity
Academic and public discourse has too often focused on the idea of achieving
some minimum representation of women—sometimes as few as one.123 Yet,
increasing the number of women on boards is only a partial step in the achievement
of a truly gender-diverse board. A truly diverse board gives women more than a seat
at the table—it grants them the ability to have a voice and an impact. Therefore,
academic and public discourse must also examine whether the roles that women are
tasked with as directors afford them equal opportunity to make an impact.
The answer to this question requires a deeper, truer measure of gender equity. It
is also central to both strands of gender diversity justifications, as it is a key
component in the case they each make for advancing gender diversity. Indeed, as
explained below, substantive gender diversity matters whether you believe that
gender diverse boards perform better or whether you believe that women are entitled
to equal treatment.
Clearly, if the motivation for better gender diversity on boards is rooted in the
antidiscrimination notion, then ensuring equal treatment within the boardroom is as
important a goal as ensuring that women get better representation on boards. If
women are denied an equal voice and are shunned from leadership roles, they are
denied equal treatment.
Advocates of the instrumental case for gender diversity must also turn their focus
to the question of substantive gender diversity. If the presence of women on boards
improves corporate performance, in its narrow or broader sense, then we must gain
insight with respect to the ability of women to truly influence and transform the way
boards work. Acknowledging the instrumental value that gender diversity brings to
the board must necessarily also lead to an examination of the ways through which
women are able to contribute to the board’s work.
It is, therefore, imperative that gender diversity discourse turn its attention to the
question of substantive diversity. Whether advocating for gender diversity out of a
social cause agenda or due to the belief that diversity improves the board’s work and
therefore company performance, substantive diversity in the boardroom is an
important dimension in ensuring such goals. Importantly, this Article does not stake
a claim regarding the proper justification for gender diversity on boards. Rather,
given the existing push for gender diversity, the Article underscores the import of the
substantive data on gender diversity for current gender diversity discourse.
Despite the importance of substantive gender diversity, investors, regulators, and
academic discourse have left this dimension unattended, focusing on the quantitative
dimension instead. Redirecting the attention of gender diversity discourse to this
important facet is the first goal of this Article.
But recognizing the value of substantive gender diversity also means that we need
to know more on the current picture of the substantive diversity of boards in the

123. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
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United States. Furthermore, if differences do exist, we need to know why, and we
need to understand the costs that these differences might cause. In the next Part, this
Article takes a first step in informing the current academic discourse with novel
findings regarding substantive gender diversity in boardrooms.
II. GENDER DIVERSITY–EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This Part provides insight into the question of substantive diversity on boards by
examining the substance of female directors’ participation on boards relative to their
male peers, as well as over time.
This study examines the S&P 1500 companies during the years 2007 to 2015.124
Because the study spans multiple years, some companies moved into the index while
other companies moved out.125 Thus, 1868 individual companies appear at least once
throughout the sample period.126 The data for this sample was originally compiled
from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) and was subsequently augmented
with data from Bloomberg, FactSet, and Equilar BoardEdge.127 On average, there
were 13,872 directors in each data year with an average of 11,980 male and 1892
female directors.128 Both descriptive statistics as well as regression models were used

124. The complete data file is with the author. Based on the data, the regression models
analyzed the impact of year, market capitalization, age of the company, and industries on the
dependent variables. This study looked at the timeframe spanning 2007 to 2015, providing the
ability to measure the change of any given variable throughout the study period. Market
capitalization was measured in thousands of dollars as reported at the end of the calendar year.
While each index represents a proxy for the size of any given company, market cap allows an
evaluation on the size of a company on each variable. The age of the company was measured
in years from the founding of the company. While the year provides information regarding the
change in a given dependent variable, the age of the company attempts to look at the
differences between older and newer companies. Finally, to limit the number of industries, the
data were limited to the following classifications: Consumer Services, Electronic Technology,
Finance, Industrial Services, Retail Trade, Technology Services, Utilities, and Other. The
“Other” variable includes all companies within the study not included in any of the other
industries and is the reference or baseline category in the multivariate regression models.
125. The S&P U.S. Indices are a family of equity indices designed to measure the market
performance of U.S. stocks trading on U.S. exchanges. The family is composed of a wide
range of indices based on size, sector, and style. The indices are weighted by float-adjusted
market capitalization and require unadjusted company market capitalization of US$6.1 billion
or more for the S&P 500, $1.6 billion to $6.8 billion for the S&P MidCap 400, and $450
million to $2.1 billion for the S&P SmallCap 600. These ranges are reviewed from time to
time to assure consistency with market conditions. See S&P Composite 1500, S&P DOW JONES
INDICES, https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-composite-1500 [https://perma.cc/KL3Z
-GSPZ].
126. The ISS director data file within the WRDS database contains various statistics on
directors in public companies in the United States. See About, WHARTON, UNIV. PA.,
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/about [https://perma.cc/J8WS-ESZR].
127. Available data for each director: Data Year; Date Started; Age; Total Number of Male
& Female Directors; Number of Other Directorships; Company Industry; Market
Capitalization; Title within the Company (if applicable); and whether the director was on the
Audit, Compensation, Corporate Governance, or Nominating Committee. See id.
128. Id.
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in this study. The former provides insight into absolute and relative numbers whereas
the latter shows how certain numbers or levels are impacted by other variables.
This Part begins with a presentation of the empirical findings regarding
quantitative and substantive gender diversity in Sections A and B, respectively.
Section C then ties the results together, underscoring the key lessons that can be
derived from the findings.
A. Quantitative Gender Diversity
As a first step, this Section follows the prevalent “quantitative” approach to
gender diversity, examining the current ratios and percentages of women on S&P
1500 companies’ boards, both across different companies and over time. These
quantitative results are an important foundation, setting the stage for the substantive
analysis that the study centers on in the following Section.
Overall, the S&P 1500 followed a similar trend to the one seen in other indices
with respect to the gender composition of boards. As a whole, the percentage of
female directors on boards has increased from 11.9% in 2007 to 16.5% in 2015. At
the start of the study, the ratio of men to women was 7.4:1. This ratio decreased to
5.07:1 in 2015.
While during the study period more men were added to corporate boards than
women, the rate of adding women to boards has increased over time. The retail
industry has the top gender parity with 19.2% of directorships represented by women.
On the other hand, Industrial Services and Electronic Technology lag behind other
industries with only 7.7% and 8.9%, respectively, of total female board participation.
Figure 1: Percentage of Female Board Directors
in the S&P 1500 by Year (2007–2015)

88.1%

87.7%

86.9%

85.5%

83.5%

11.9%

12.3%

13.1%

14.5%

16.5%

2007

2009

2011
Female

2013

2015

Male

Table 1 presents regression results of the percentage of women on boards on
several independent variables. The percentage of women increased on average by .5
percentage points for every additional year of the study. Additionally, the size of a
company is positively correlated with better boardroom gender parity. That is, for
every one-million-dollar increase in a company’s market capitalization, the
percentage of women on a board increased by .5 percentage points. Finally, older
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companies tend to have more women relative to their younger counterparts. For each
additional year since formation, the percentage of women on a given board increased
by .04 percentage points.
Table 1: Regression Results

Year (2007 = Year 0)
Market Cap (in thousands of $)
Age of Company (years)
Consumer Services (industry)
Electronic Technology (industry)
Finance (industry)
Industrial Services (industry)
Retail Trade (industry)
Technology Services (industry)
Utilities (industry)
Constant
N
R2

Average
4.1
10112.34
17.02
.149
.089
.133
.077
.192
.105
.191***
12,167

Female Ratio
.005***
4.54 x 10-7***
.0005***

.095***
12,167
.0549

Female Ratio
.005***
4.67 x 10-7***
.0004***
.021***
-.039***
.006**
-.050***
.051***
-.026***
.058***
.096***
12,167
.1152

Table 1: This Table presents the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the
dependent variable is female board percentage. The first column presents the averages for each
independent variable. Industry averages are proportions. The second column presents OLS results for
Year, Market Cap, and Age. The third column presents regression results after accounting for industry.
*** (**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels.

These results confirm the conclusions of previous studies, showing a general trend
towards increased board gender diversity, at least as measured by the ratio of men to
women. Importantly, the results also highlight that significant differences between
companies exist, depending on industry, size, and age of the company. These
differences are often underexplored in current scholarship.
B. Substantive Gender Diversity
This Section starts where prior studies have ended, examining a set of substantive
measures of gender diversity in the boardroom. These variables are important factors
when determining the level of parity that female directors enjoy.
By examining all available information from the compiled data regarding the age,
tenure, leadership roles, service on other boards and specific workload, and
responsibilities within the boardroom, this Section sheds light on observed
differences between male and female directors. Importantly, while many unobserved
dynamics may influence board parity, this study has narrowly focused on observable
metrics. In part, the focus stems from lack of available data regarding unobserved
board dynamics. Yet, it is also shaped by the practical need for measurable
substantive variables that can be easily and neutrally collected and compared.
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1. Tenure
Director tenure has become an important factor in corporate governance. 129 Yet,
while most studies look at director tenure as a whole, the relative tenure of men and
women could be important in the context of substantive gender diversity. If
companies appoint more women but retain them for shorter tenures than their male
counterparts, this could counteract the increased representation of women on the
board. Particularly, shorter tenure may limit the ability of a director to gain clout
within the boardroom, and the company, and marginalize her vis-à-vis the longer
tenured male directors in the room. If men and women have significant and
systematic differences in their tenure, a concern may arise as to the true level of
substantive equality in the boardroom.
As shown in Table 2, the data indeed reveals systemic differences in the tenure of
men and women. In total, men had an average tenure of between 1.99 (22%) and 2.64
(27%) years longer than women. This overall disparity is more than a byproduct of
recent board appointments for more women as it has persisted over time, across
measures of industry and market size. 130
Table 2: Average Tenure Length by Gender and Year (2007–2015)

Female
Male
Difference

2007
6.87
9.22
2.35

2008
7.14
9.38
2.24

2009
7.48
9.47
1.99

2010
7.60
9.67
2.07

2011
7.73
9.84
2.12

2012
7.80
10.03
2.23

2013
7.79
10.04
2.25

2014
7.67
10.06
2.39

2015
7.42
10.06
2.64

In 2007, women had an average tenure of 6.87 years. This number increased to
7.8 years in 2012, but subsequently fell to 7.42 in 2015. Men, on the other hand, had
an average tenure of approximately 10 years from 2012 to 2016. Figure 2 shows that
differences between men and women are even starker as one moves from the S&P
500 (large-cap companies) to the S&P 400 (mid-cap) and subsequently to the S&P
600 (small-cap). The difference in 2015 between men and women for the S&P 500
was 1.94 years (9.61 years versus 7.67 years). In the S&P 400 and S&P 600, the
differences were 3.06 years (10.27 versus 7.21) and 3.15 years (10.36 versus 7.21)
respectively. This suggests that the gap between men and women is much closer in
larger companies.

129. See Nili, supra note 52 (discussing the impact of director tenure on corporate
governance).
130. Importantly, the median tenure of women is two years lower than that of men, even
during the last few years. The standard deviation of the tenure of women has also not changed
dramatically, reducing the concern that the disparity is driven by the recent influx of women
to boardrooms.

BEY O ND TH E NU MB ER S

2019]

169

Male/Female Gap (in years)

Figure 2: Gap in Average Tenure of Male vs. Female Board Members
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2.85
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Looking at the difference in the tenure of female directors across industries,
Utilities had the longest tenured women at an average of 8.39 years of service.
Technology Services represents the shortest average tenure of female directors with
an average of only 5.57 years of service. According to the regression results
displayed in Table 3, even after controlling for age of the company under the
assumption that companies in the Utilities Industry are older than Technology
Services, these two industries remained at the extremes of the tenure spectrum.
Table 3: Regression Results
Average
Year (2007 = Year 0)
Market Cap (in thousands of $)
Age of Company (years)
Consumer Services (industry)
Electronic Technology (industry)
Finance (industry)
Industrial Services (industry)
Retail Trade (industry)
Technology Services (industry)
Utilities (industry)
Constant
N
R2

4.26
12733.04
18.6
7.419
6.597
7.681
6.472
7.230
5.570
8.397

Female
Tenure Length
.035*
5.73 x 10-7
.034***

6.70***
9,038
.0216

Female
Tenure Length
.039**
1.5 x 10-6
.034***
-.221
-1.167***
.135
-1.193***
-.566***
-2.122***
.180
6.929***
9,038
.0354

Table 3: This Table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is female tenure
length. The first column presents averages for each independent variable. The second column presents
OLS results for Year, Market Cap, and Age. The third column presents results after accounting for
industry. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels.
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2. Age
Age disparity between groups of directors might affect different boards in various
ways. In some cases, boards may enjoy the added level of age heterogeneity while in
others age disparity may be a cause of friction. Figure 3 presents the observed
information regarding the gender and age disparity. Until 2015, when the average
age of women serving on corporate boards decreased (likely due to the increased
additions of women), the average age of directors of both genders steadily increased
throughout the study period. On average, male directors tended to be older than their
female counterparts. In 2007, the difference between men and women was 4.38 years
(61.86 versus 57.48). This difference shrank substantially to 2.49 years in 2014, but
rose again in 2015. As of 2015 male directors were on average 64 years old while
female directors were, on average, 60.51 years old. Looking at women individually,
the average director was older in the large cap companies, but little difference exists
between mid- and small-cap stocks.
Figure 3: Average Age of Directors by Gender and Year (2007–2015)
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3. Chair Positions
A key indicator for influence in the boardroom is the position of the chair of the
board. As chair, a director has control of the board’s agenda in addition to other
formal and informal powers.131 While in many companies the CEO is also the
chairperson of the board, recent trends have led to a separation of these roles with
many companies appointing independent directors as board chair.132

131. For a discussion of the chair’s role, see, for example, Stanislav Shekshnia, How to Be
a Good Board Chair, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/03/how-to-bea-good-board-chair [https://perma.cc/ECM2-YWBD].
132. See Ryan Krause, Mike Withers & Matthew Semadeni, Sharing the Lead: Examining
the Causes and Consequences of Lead Independent Director Appointment, HARV. L. SCH. F.
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/09/20/sharing-the-lead-examining-the-causes-and-consequences-of-lead-independentdirector-appointment [https://perma.cc/9E5N-VLQL].
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Examining the ratio of men to women as non-CEO chairs of boards,133 while
controlling for their relative size, the data show a significant disparity between
female and male directors. First, in absolute numbers the differences are striking. In
2015, there were only 27 female directors who served as chair compared to 769
males. As a ratio of the total number of directors, the disparity is still striking.
Women serving as chairwoman were only 1% out of the entire female director
sample, while men were six times more likely to serve as chairman, standing at 6.5%
of the male director sample. 134
4. Lead Independent Director Role
When the CEO also serves as the chair of the board, or when the chair is not an
independent director, many companies name a “lead independent director.” This
director has a leadership role among the independent directors on the board and often
serves as counterweight to the CEO/Chair.135 Examining the ratio of men to women
serving as lead independent directors, while controlling for their relative size, the
data, again, show significant disparity between the genders. In 2015, only 57 female
directors served as lead independent directors compared to 539 males. As a ratio of
the respective total number of directors, women serving as lead independent directors
were only 3.6% out of the entire female director sample, while men were more than
two times more likely to serve as lead directors, standing at 7.4% of the male sample.
Table 4: Lead Independent Director Role

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

# Female Lead
Independent
Directors
28
39
43
44
49
57

% of Entire % of Female
Sample
Directors
0.39%
0.50%
0.54%
0.52%
0.57%
0.65%

2.73%
3.38%
3.51%
3.30%
3.40%
3.64%

# Male Lead
Independent
Directors
434
492
516
521
534
539

% of
Entire
Sample
6.08%
6.33%
6.45%
6.21%
6.18%
6.10%

% of Male Total
Directors Directors
7.09%
7.43%
7.61%
7.39%
7.42%
7.42%

7143
7777
8002
8384
8639
8833

Some may argue that the gap in leadership roles may be explained by the fact that
women have yet to achieve sufficient tenure, especially due to the increased addition
of women to boards in recent years. Therefore, as their tenure increases in the next
5–10 years so would their leadership representation. The data contradicts this line of
reasoning. First, as discussed above, the tenure gap is not merely a result of the

133. To prevent skewing of the results by the subset of chairs who are also CEOs (and are
overwhelmingly men), the study only examined chair roles held by independent directors.
134. Similarly, according to a recent Equilar report, in 2016, only 7.6% of nonexecutive
chair, CEO/Chair, or lead director roles were occupied by women. Boardroom Indicator:
18.9%, EQUILAR (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.equilar.com/blogs/bi/10-27-2016-boardroomindicator-18.9.html [https://perma.cc/5LRD-22CX].
135. See Krause et. al., supra note 132 (“[M]any have argued that the CEO and chair
positions must be separated to prevent the conflict of interest inherent to the CEO leading the
board.”).
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addition of women in greater numbers. 136 Second, when examining the leadership
percentages of each gender, the gap is not a function of tenure. According to the
results displayed in Table 5, the data shows consistent gaps in leadership likelihood
even after controlling for tenure. In each of the four tenure quartiles, women lag men
in their likelihood to take the role of chair or lead independent director.
Table 5: Leadership Roles and Tenure
Leadership Role Likelihood (as a percentage of the respective sample)
0–4 Years of
Tenure
Female
Male

4–8 Years of
Tenure
Female
Male

8–12 Years of
Tenure
Female
Male

12+ Years of
Tenure
Female
Male

2007

0.63%

2.12%

0.75%

2.19%

0.50%

1.78%

0.31%

4.11%

2008

0.88%

2.80%

0.82%

3.09%

0.65%

2.24%

0.59%

4.74%

2009

0.99%

2.43%

1.16%

2.93%

0.87%

2.39%

0.58%

5.19%

2010

1.00%

2.30%

0.94%

3.36%

0.94%

2.92%

1.11%

6.24%

2011

0.49%

0.91%

0.76%

2.33%

0.87%

2.56%

1.25%

5.89%

2012

0.47%

0.90%

0.63%

2.18%

0.94%

2.72%

1.41%

6.14%

2013

0.49%

0.91%

0.69%

2.20%

0.89%

2.48%

1.28%

6.32%

2014

0.37%

1.02%

0.56%

2.16%

1.02%

2.44%

1.44%

6.16%

2015

0.35%

1.28%

0.62%

1.84%

0.88%

2.30%

1.71%

6.09%

5. Service on Other Boards
One of the criteria in looking for new directors is prior experience.137 With fewer
women holding existing directorship experience, these women might be more likely
to serve on multiple boards. In other words, with a smaller potential pool of
candidates, boards may be tapping the same women to fill diversity initiatives,
instead of expanding the pool altogether. The data presented in Figure 4 support this
argument. The average number of boards on which female directors sit on has
remained relatively constant throughout the time period starting at 1.97 boards in
2007 to 1.95 boards in 2015. For men, however, the average number of boards has
decreased from 1.88 to 1.78 over the same period.

136. See supra Section II.B.1.
137. Renée B. Adams, Ali C. Akyol & Patrick Verwijmeren, Director Skill Sets 44 (Mar.
31, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2365748 [https://perma.cc/MD8C-VGR9] (finding that 13% of nominating committees
specifically list outside board experience as a requisite qualification for inclusion as a
nominee).
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Figure 4: Average Number of Boards Directors
Sit On by Gender and Year (2007–2015)
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Table 6 breaks out this information by S&P index. Looking across the indices, on
average, the smaller cap stocks have fewer “busy” or “overboarded directors.”138
That is, both men and women are less likely to serve on multiple boards in smaller
cap indices. Further, the gap between the number of boards each gender sits on
shrinks when moving from the S&P 500 to the S&P 600. For example, in 2015 the
difference in average number of boards between women and men in S&P 500
companies was .15 boards whereas in the S&P 600 the difference was only .06
boards.
Table 6: Average Number of Boards Directors
Sit On by Gender, Year, and Index (2007–2015)
2007
S&P 500
S&P 400
S&P 600

Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male

2.25
2.17
1.82
1.87
1.64
1.62

2010
2.16
2.06
1.76
1.77
1.56
1.58

2012
2.09
2.03
1.87
1.75
1.58
1.56

2015
2.18
2.03
1.93
1.75
1.61
1.55

6. Service on Board Committees
What roles do women and men hold on the various key committees139 in the
boardroom? Examining the membership on specific board committees provides a

138. “Busy Directors” are characterized as individuals who serve on multiple boards. This
term generally has a negative connotation in that busy directors spend so much time on
different boards that they are unable to devote their full time to any given board. Evidence of
directors after mergers suggests that busy directors are associated with worse corporate
performance and lower earnings. See May Hu & Pei Ni Huynh, How Do Cross-Border
Mergers and Acquisitions Affect Firms’ Management and Stakeholders? Part 2, 20 CORP. FIN.
REV. 13, 21 (2015).
139. These are the Audit, Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Nominating
committees. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
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more accurate picture of each director’s role on the board and the impact they may
have on the corporation.140 This substantive aspect can enable us to better detect
whether women are equal partners on the board, whether women are relegated to a
secondary role within the boardroom, or whether women take an increased workload
due to their lower numbers.
a. Average Number of Committees
Throughout the entire sample period, women sat on between .25 (2009) and .20
(2014) more board committees than their male counterparts. This suggests that
female directors have an increased workload on the board as compared to male
directors.
Figure 5: Average Number of Committees per Board
Directors by Gender and Year (2007–2015)
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b. Percent of Men and Women on At Least One Board Committee
Because directors sitting on more than two board committees can skew the
average number of committees higher, looking at the relative pools of directors who
sit on more than one board can help confirm the conclusions of the previous Section.
Figure 6 presents the data. In 2015, 84% of women directors compared to 71% of
men directors served on at least one committee. 141 Thus, female directors outpace
their male counterparts, both in terms of average committees and involvement on at
least one committee.

140. See Klein, supra note 53.
141. This percentage point difference existed in three of the sample years where in the
other six years the difference was fourteen percentage points.
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Figure 6: Percentage of Men and Women on At Least
One Committee by Year (2007–2015)
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c. Likelihood of Sitting on a Given Number of Committees
Men are much more likely to participate on zero committees while women are
more likely to participate on one, two, or three committees throughout the sample
period. A woman had a 31% chance of sitting on three committees, 19% chance of
sitting on two committees, and 29% chance of sitting on one committee. A man, on
the other hand, had a 25% chance of sitting on three committees, 18% chance of
sitting on two committees, and 23% chance of sitting on one committee.
Accordingly, women directors seem to be tasked with more committee work than
their male counterparts are. Table 8 breaks down the percentages of female board
directors by industry and number of committees.142

142. Table 8 statistical results are from a univariate regression model used to break down
the averages from Table 7 by industry. Unless otherwise noted, the average of each industry
was statistically significantly different from the average of the rest of the sample at the 5%
level. The average likelihood for women to sit on zero committees was 13%. Given a female
that was in Consumer Services, that likelihood rose to 20.5%, while for Industrial Services
that likelihood declined to 10.4%. The average likelihood for any given female director to sit
on one committee was 30%. If a given female was on Technology Services, that likelihood
rose to 33.7%, however for Consumer Services that likelihood declined to 22.6%. The average
likelihood of a female sitting on two committees across all industries was 20%. If that female
was on a Consumer Services board, the likelihood was 29.1% whereas an Industrial Services
female board member had a 15.2% chance of being on two committees. Next, the average
likelihood for a female to sit on three committees is 32%. At the top end, if a female is on a
Retail Trade board, the likelihood rises to 35.9% and on the low end a female on a Consumer
Services board has a 25.3% chance of sitting on three committees. Finally, the likelihood for
a female to sit on four committees is 5%. Again, a female on a Consumer Services board only
has a 2.6% chance of sitting on four committees while a female on an Industrial Services board
has an 8% chance of the same.
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Table 7: Percent of Directors Participating on Multiple
Committees by Number of Committees and Gender

Female
Male

Zero
16%
28%

One
29%
23%

Two
19%
18%

Three
31%
25%

Four
5%
6%

Table 8: Percent of Female Board Directors Participating on
Multiple Committees by Number of Committees and Industry
Industry
Consumer
Services
Electronic
Technology
Finance
Industrial
Services
Retail Trade
Technology
Services
Utilities
Average
Difference
from Largest
to Smallest

Zero
.205***

One
.226***

Two
.291***

Three
.253***

Four
.026***

.129

.315

.168***

.346*

.042

.155***
.104

.320***
.332

.174***
.152**

.281***
.332

.069***
.080**

.155**
.124

.238***
.337**

.174***
.207

.359***
.299

.074**
.033**

.111
.13
.101

.302
.3
.111

.224
.2
.139

.325
.32
.106

.038*
.05
.054

Table 8: Statistical significance determined using univariate regression. *** (**,*) indicates statistical
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels.

Next, the analysis examined the likelihood that an individual director sits on a
specific number of board committees (ranging from zero to four).143 The regression
results are presented in Table 9. For example, all coefficients for Female are positive,
suggesting that being a female has a stronger influence on serving on one or more
committees than it does on serving on zero committees. Being a female has the
strongest effect for serving on three committees. The effect of age increases as we
move from zero to four committees. Industry type also matters at times. For example,
Industrial Services directors are more likely to serve on four committees than on zero
committees. For other industries, directors are less likely to serve on more
committees.

143. The process of estimating the likelihood took three steps. First, a multinomial logistic
regression analysis was used to model the number of committees a board member participated
on as a function of the director’s gender, age, and the industry of company (a multinomial
logistic regression is preferred when the dependent variable consists of multiple, related binary
categories. Here the dependent variable is whether a director served on zero, one, two, three,
or four committees). Next, a number of hypothetical scenarios were created. Finally,
coefficients from the regression analysis were used to estimate the probability of a member
serving on specified numbers of committees for each scenario.
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Table 9: Regression Results

Female
Company Age
Consumer Services (industry)
Electronic Technology
(industry)
Finance (industry)
Industrial Services (industry)
Retail Trade (industry)
Technology Services
(industry)
Utilities (industry)
Constant
N
AIC

One
Committee
0.951***
0.033***
-0.271**
-0.077

Two
Committees
0.866***
0.053***
-0.255*
-0.199**

Three
Committees
1.027***
0.059***
-0.403***
-0.130

Four
Committees
0.623***
0.079***
-0.985***
-0.147

-0.229***
-0.263
-0.205*
-0.011

-0.316***
-0.209
-0.489***
-0.157

-0.405***
-0.231
-0.289***
-0.181

0.002
0.521***
0.047
-0.054

0.180
-2.176***
12,432
37135

0.050
-3.664***

-0.065
-3.726***

-0.245
-6.634***

Table 9: This Table presents results from a multinomial logistical regression where the dependent variable
is whether the director served on zero, one, two, three, or four committees. *** (**,*) indicates statistical
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels. The zero committee category is the reference category, so
coefficients are relative to their estimated influence on serving on zero committees.

d. Likelihood of Sitting on a Given Committee
One potential gender parity concern is that women may be excluded from specific
important board committees. The descriptive statistics in Table 10 mostly alleviate
such a concern as women are serving in large numbers on all of the key board
committees.144

144. Unless otherwise indicated, the differences between industries were statistically
significant at the 5% level.
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Table 10: Percent of Board Directors that Are Female
in Each Industry of Each Committee Type
Industry
Consumer Services
Electronic Technology
Finance
Industrial Services
Retail Trade
Technology Services
Utilities
Average
Difference from Largest
to Smallest

Nominating
.421***
.47
.45***
.477
.509
.46
.479
.49
.088

Corporate
Governance
.418***
.47
.442***
.477
.508
.451
.474
.48
.09

Compensation
.448
.453
.407***
.496**
.472**
.42
.458
.44
.089

Audit
.384***
.464
.488***
.501*
.468
.48
.464
.46
.094

Table 10: Statistical significance determined using univariate regression. *** (**,*) indicates statistical
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels.

Following these descriptive statistics, the study modeled whether an individual is
on each of the four committees using a logistic regression.145 The independent
variables remain Age, Gender, and Industry. The results of the four logistic
regressions are displayed in Table 11.146 Females are more likely than their male
colleagues to serve on the Corporate Governance and Compensation committees and
less likely than males to serve on the Audit Committee after controlling for Age and
Industry. When it comes to serving on these specific committees, however, there is
little variation by industry. The lone exception is that individuals in the Retail Trade
industry are slightly less likely to serve on the Corporate Governance Committee
than those in other industries. Older individuals are more likely to serve on the
Corporate Governance Committee while younger individuals are less likely to serve
on the Audit Committee.

145. A logistic regression is appropriate when the dependent variable is a single binary
outcome.
146. The few individuals serving on nominating committees make the coefficient estimates
for this regression highly uncertain.
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Table 11: Regression Results
Nominating
Committee
Female
Company Age
Consumer
Services (industry)
Electronic
Technology
(industry)
Finance (industry)
Industrial Services
(industry)
Retail Trade
(industry)
Technology
Services (industry)
Utilities (industry)
Constant
N
AIC

-1.037
0.041
-16.223

Corporate
Governance
Committee
0.254***
0.012***
0.152

Compensation
Committee

Audit
Committee

0.128**
0.004
0.039

-0.214***
-0.008***
-0.091

0.102

-0.077

-0.010

0.038

0.435
-16.359

0.028
-0.199

-0.073
-0.028

0.049
0.106

-16.194

-0.284*

0.000

0.107

-16.197

-0.039

0.012

0.011

-16.263
-8.857***
16
243

0.168
-2.939***
995
6299

-0.019
-0.938***
3049
11685

-0.046
0.783***
5122
12601

Table 11: This Table presents results from four separate logistic regressions where the dependent variables
are whether the director served on the Nominating, Corporate Governance, Compensation, or Audit
Committees. *** (**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels.

e. Committee Chair Position
As shown in Part II.B.4, board leadership positions tilt heavily in favor of male
directors. Looking at leadership at the board committee level, the Article finds that
female directors are also underrepresented in board committee leadership. Yet, there
has been a steady improvement in female committee leadership over time. Table 12
below illustrates the improvement in the percentage of female committee chairs over
time while also showing that the ratio of women chairs still lags behind their relative
representation on these committees. For instance, while in 2007 only 7% of Audit
Committee chairs in the sample were women (102 directors), that ratio doubled to
14% in 2015 (210 directors). However, in both years the percentage of Audit
Committee members that were women was significantly higher compared to their
committee chair representation. In 2007, 12% of the Audit Committee members were
women while only 7% served as chairs, and in 2015, 18% of the Audit Committee
members were women with only 14% serving as chairs. These disparities are
statistically significant and hold across committees and over time.
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Table 12: Comparison of Committee Chair Position
Year

Nomination
Committee

Governance
Committee

Compensation
Committee

Audit
Committee

Any
Committee

2007

.12/.13*
(164/737)

.12/.14*
(162/734)

.08/.12*
(120/658)

.07/.12*
(102/698)

.11/.13*
(446/1342)

2008

.12/.14*
(171/814)

.12/.14*
(167/812)

.10/.12*
(139/708)

.08/.13*
(118/739)

.11/.14*
(477/1456)

2009

.12/.14*
(173/823)

.12/.14*
(170/822)

.09/.13*
(138/740)

.09/.13*
(134/753)

.11/.14*
(481/1481)

2010

.13/.14*
(183/839)

.13/.14*
(179/832)

.10/.13*
(151/772)

.10/.13*
(142/769)

.12/.14*
(513/1531)

2011

.14/.15*
(197/852)

.14/.15*
(195/850)

.10/.13*
(153/753)

.10/.14*
(154/800)

.13/.14*
(545/1552)

2012

.13/.15*
(197/891)

.13/.16*
(195/885)

.11/.14*
(165/806)

.12/.14*
(174/852)

.13/.15*
(557/1655)

2013

.15/.16*
(225/949)

.15/.16*
(224/945)

.12/.15*
(175/855)

.12/.15*
(187/929)

.14/.16*
(624/1764)

2014

.16/.17
(235/1002)

.16/.17
(236/994)

.13/.16*
(187/924)

.14/.17*
(211/968)

.15/.17*
(658/1855)

.16/.19*
.16/.19*
.14/.17*
.14/.18*
.15/.18*
(241/1070)
(239/1063)
(204/973)
(210/1030)
(684/1964)
Table 12: This Table presents the percentage of female committee chairs compared to their ratio on the
committee. The first number in each cell is the proportion of companies with a female chair on a given
committee and year. The second number is the average proportion of female directors on a given
committee and year for all companies in the data. The star indicates that the second number in a cell is
statistically distinguishable from the first. The first number in the parentheses is the raw number of female
chairs and the second number is the raw number of female directors on these committees.

2015

C. Key Lessons from the Findings
Several broad observations can be drawn from the empirical findings. First, it is
clear that important differences exist between genders not only in the quantitative
numbers of each gender in the boardroom but also in the substantive characteristics
and roles within the boardroom that each gender is more likely to hold.
Second, the data show that differences between genders vary both across different
industries and across market cap sizes. These differences highlight the need to
examine companies on an individual level, rather than through an aggregate ratio, for
a true and more complete assessment of the gender parity on boards. The variation
the data show is also important for future academic research. As discussed above, a
large body of empirical literature is focused on the link between gender diversity and
company performance.147 These studies have yet to use data on substantive diversity,
such as the data presented in this Article. Combining this new data with the
quantitative data analyzed in prior studies can better reveal gradations between
female participation in the boardrooms and the impact on company performance.

147. See supra Section I.C.
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Third, the data on substantive diversity are full of nuance and are subject to
interpretation. While some of the results may more clearly suggest a concern
regarding gender parity, other findings are less clear-cut, and some of the findings
provide a more optimistic depiction of substantive parity.
Finally, it is important to underscore that the findings are limited to available data
regarding director participation in the boardroom. The aforementioned variables are,
of course, not an exhaustive list, and they do not reflect less observable data such as
board dynamics and other measures of clout that are important factors for a more
complete picture of the gender parity in each boardroom.
Moving to some of the specific findings, several trends suggest a potential lack of
substantive gender parity. First, the shorter tenure of women on boards should be of
potential concern. Tenure has been recognized to play an important role in the
influence that one possesses.148 Since longer tenured directors arguably carry more
clout and influence in the board room,149 they might inhibit and restrain, intentionally
or inadvertently, the ability and willingness of less tenured directors to act
independently and might jeopardize the ability of the boardroom to foster an “open
to all ideas” atmosphere.150 If there is a significant tenure disparity along gender
lines, as the findings suggest, then women might face an uphill battle to have their
voice heard in a boardroom controlled by long-tenured male directors.151 The fact
that women are already a minority in the boardroom further magnifies the impact of
tenure disparity. Studies have found that without a critical mass 152 women encounter
“social isolation . . . heightened visibility” and pressure to accept “stereotyped
roles.”153 Tenure disparity may exacerbate these concerns, making women even less
likely to overcome these obstacles.
Importantly, the Article finds that director tenure is positively correlated with the
likelihood of having a leadership role.154 If women systematically serve for shorter
terms, then their opportunities to take these leadership roles is negatively affected.
Clearly, the tenure disparity is concerning as it may influence the intraboard
dynamics. It is also important to understand why women leave boards faster than
men. Are they pushed out (explicitly or implicitly)? Do they suffer from

148. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 125 (1997)
(describing the impact tenure has on power, clout, and influence in the political sphere).
149. See Nili, supra note 52 (discussing the impact of director tenure on the board
dynamics).
150. Id.
151. Of course, in some instances, long-tenured directors are less involved in the
boardroom work, or newer directors exert more influence than their longer termed peers do.
However, generally tenure correlates with greater clout.
152. Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 408–11 (discussing the issues with token directors
and reviewing the studies finding that a critical mass is needed).
153. See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, THE PROBLEMS OF TOKENISM 39–40 (1974)
(monograph prepared for the Center for Research on Women in Higher Education and the
Professions); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sarah White, Wanted: Female Corporate
Directors, 29 PACE L. REV. 249, 257–64 (2009) (exploring behavior of token women directors
on all-male boards).
154. The Article finds that leadership is positively correlated with a 1.51 years increase for
males and a 0.62 years increase for females. Females in leadership roles have 1.96 fewer years
of service than males (for nonleaders; females serve 2.85 fewer years among leaders).
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overextension and overcommitment to board committees? Or do they have more
options to choose from, resulting in more frequent moves between boards?
Second, the underrepresentation of women in leadership roles, as chairwomen, as
lead independent directors, or as committee chairs, is a potential signal regarding the
level of substantive parity on the board. Women are less likely to hold leadership
roles either as chair of the board/lead independent director or as chairs of the various
board committees. These formal leadership roles carry significant formal powers. As
chair, the director has control of the board or committee’s agenda in addition to other
formal and informal powers. In addition, these formal leadership roles carry a
symbolic value, signaling the importance and value of the director. The fact that
women do not hold these leadership positions in equal numbers, even relative to their
current low ratio on the board, is a potential indication that they have yet to climb
sufficiently high on the board’s totem pole.
Third, the data reflect that the pool of female directors serving on public boards
is smaller than the pool of males and that women serve on more than one board in
greater numbers. The data also show that women are also more likely to serve on
more board committees on each board. The smaller pool of women directors may
reflect entry barriers to joining a board. It may be the case that some women are not
considered for board positions due to nomination metrics that may overemphasize
requisite work experience, positions that men are currently holding in much greater
numbers.155 At the same time, the data indicate that women might be taking on more
board work compared to their fellow directors. While this can stem from an attempt
to ensure diversity in the many board committees, it may also lead to women to being
overworked.
On the other side, the fact that women sit on multiple boards in greater numbers
and the fact that they serve, on average, on more committees, can also be viewed in
a positive light. Women enjoy greater exposure to the company (or different
companies), which potentially allows them to enrich the board discussions and
increase their clout within the board.
The data reflect better parity between the genders, or at least movement in the
right direction, in some of the other metrics examined as well. The ratio of women
on boards is on the rise. There has also been a positive movement in the ratio of
women as committee chairs, signaling an overall positive trend. Finally, women
seem to gain access to all of the important board committees, albeit in lesser numbers
on the key audit committee.
In sum, the data exemplify the importance of a more detailed examination of the
roles of women on boards. Women are clearly gaining ground in their representation
on boards, but at the same time, significant disparities still exist between the genders
regarding the roles and attributes of directors.
III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND ITS CURRENT FLAWS
This Part reviews the current regulatory approach to gender diversity in
boardrooms in the United States. In Section A, the Article describes the development

155. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 404 (discussing the bias that might lead to
underrepresentation of women on boards).
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of the current disclosure regime in the United States. Section B provides novel data
on the gender diversity disclosure practices of companies, against the backdrop of
the current regulatory framework. Section C then brings the two previous Sections
together, underscoring the flaws in the current regulatory approach.
A. The Evolution of Diversity Disclosure Requirements
The United States has taken a soft regulatory approach156 to the issue of gender
diversity, requiring companies to disclose only whether they have a diversity policy
in place,157 and to provide a description of the policy to investors.158 This approach
stands in sharp contrast to the mandatory diversity quotas many European countries
have recently adopted, requiring companies to maintain a specific ratio of women to
men on the board.159
Prior to 2009, boards in the United States were not required to make any
disclosures regarding the nominating procedures related to diversity. 160 In fact, Item
407 at the time made no mention at all of diversity.161
In its announcement of a 2009 amendment to Regulation S-K, the SEC noted it
received numerous comments regarding the need for diversity disclosure within
boards.162 Among the main advocates were two of the largest, and most socially
active, pension funds: California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(“CalPERS”) and California State Teachers’ Retirement System (“CalSTRS”).163
The announcement noted that many of these commenters desired disclosure of
diversity to provide insight into corporate governance practices. 164 This, in turn,
would provide additional information during proxy season when determining
whether to vote for or against board nominees. 165
In response to these communications, the SEC adopted Item 407(c) “requir[ing]
disclosure of whether, and if so how, a nominating committee considers diversity in
identifying nominees for director.”166 The regulation then requires that “if the
nominating committee (or the board) has a policy with regard to the consideration of
diversity in identifying director nominees, disclosure would be required of how this
policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating committee (or the board)
assesses the effectiveness of its policy.”167 The regulation, however, does not define

156. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 82.
157. See SEC Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2018).
158. Id.
159. See Véronique Magnier & Darren Rosenblum, Quotas and the Transatlantic
Divergence of Corporate Governance, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 249 (2014).
160. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 418–19 (discussing the new requirements that
were added in 2010).
161. See SEC Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2018).
162. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9089, 74 Fed. Reg.
68334, 68343 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 249, 274).
163. Id. at 68343 n.116.
164. Id. at 68344–45.
165. Id. at 68334.
166. Id. at 68343.
167. Id. at 68343–44.
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the term “diversity,” and it left it to companies to define what they mean by diversity
in their policies and disclosures.168
B. Current Company Disclosures
The regulatory framework, laid out in Section A, leaves a broad spectrum of
parameters that constitute compliance with the SEC’s diversity disclosure
requirements, including making no diversity disclosure at all. Not surprisingly,
companies vary in their board diversity disclosure practices. 169 Some companies
provide detailed information to investors regarding their diversity policies.170 Other
companies merely recite the words necessary to comply with Item 407(c)(vi) and no
more.171
This Section explores director diversity disclosures in practice. To do so, using a
hand-collected data set, the disclosure statements of one hundred public companies
for the years of 2008, 2012, and 2016 were analyzed. 172 To account for both large,
high profile, companies as well as smaller, less visible public companies, fifty of the
companies make up the Fortune 50 and the remaining fifty are Fortune 2000 smallcap companies. Some companies did not have proxy statements available in all of
the three examined years, bringing the sample to ninety-four companies in 2008 and
ninety-eight companies in 2012 and 2016, respectively.
As Figure 7 below shows, in 2008, only fifty-five of ninety-four companies
disclosed that they considered diversity, in a general sense, at all. In 2012 and 2016,
following the amendment to Regulation S-K,173 those numbers increased to ninetythree and ninety-five companies, respectively. However, corporations’ consideration
of diversity did not necessarily specifically include gender as part of the criteria for

168. Id. at 68344.
169. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 173–213; Thomas Lee Hazen & Lissa Lamkin Broome,
Board Diversity and Proxy Disclosure, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 39, 59–66 (2011) (reviewing
filings for 2010 for the Fortune 100 companies); Packel, supra note 85, at 223–28; Tamara S.
Smallman, Note, The Glass Boardroom: The SEC’s Role in Cracking the Door Open So
Women May Enter, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 817 (2013) (concluding that disclosures
were “largely superficial and uninformative . . . [and] failed to comply with the SEC’s current
regulation”). Dhir has conducted a similar survey of company disclosures for the years 2010–
2013. DHIR, supra note 20 at 173–213. While our findings are similar in some aspects, we
focus on different aspects of the disclosures, in addition to differences in the sample of
companies and years covered.
170. See, e.g., Conn. Water Serv. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 30,
2016); Essendant Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2016); Microsoft Corp.,
Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Oct. 18, 2016); Navient Corp., Proxy Statement (Form
DEF 14A) (Apr. 15, 2016).
171. See, e.g., Discovery Comm., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 30, 2016);
Six Flags Entm’t Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2016); Skechers U.S.A.,
Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 29, 2016).
172. The data was derived manually from a sample of 100 companies. This sample contains
fifty Fortune 50 companies and fifty Fortune 2000 small-cap companies. For each company,
the company’s proxy statements in the years 2008, 2012, and 2016 were analyzed and coded.
The complete data file is on file with the author.
173. See supra Section III.A.
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creating a more diverse board. In 2008, for instance, only five corporations
specifically disclosed in their proxy statements that they consider gender as criteria
for selecting director nominees. Although this number significantly increased to
forty-two in 2012 and fifty-three in 2016, still only barely a majority of corporations
indicated that they specifically considered gender when selecting director nominees.
Figure 7: Trends in Gender Diversity Disclosure
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Importantly, many of the companies that do not have a formal policy in place have
noted that while they lack a formal diversity policy, they consider the diversity of
perspectives, experiences, and backgrounds of director nominees when slating a new
board. For example, Quanex (NYSE: NX) uses the language, “[a]lthough the
company has no formal policy on diversity for board members, the board considers
diversity of experience and background in an effort to ensure that the composition of
our directors creates a strong and effective board.” 174 While such language is
compliant with the SEC rule, it illustrates the vagueness that companies can use when
addressing diversity.175
Quanex is not an outlier. Only six out of the 100 companies reviewed currently
have a definition of diversity laid out in their disclosures. Thus, even though

174. Quanex Bldg. Prods. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 69 (Jan. 29, 2016).
175. Contrast this approach with General Motors’s (GM) statement:
Although GM does not have a formal policy governing diversity among Board
members, we continually strive to add directors of diverse backgrounds. We
recognize the value of overall diversity and consider members’ opinions,
perspectives, personal and professional experiences, and backgrounds, including
gender, race, ethnicity, and country of origin, when considering Board
candidates. We believe that the judgment and perspectives offered by a diverse
board of directors improves the quality of decision-making and enhances the
Company’s business performance. We also believe such diversity can help the
Board respond more effectively to the needs of customers, shareholders,
employees, suppliers, and other stakeholders worldwide.
General Motors Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 10 (Apr. 22, 2016).
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corporations may have diversity policies, and at times they may explicitly seek
gender diversity, an overwhelming majority of such policies lack the desired clarity
and focus, instead crafted in a manner that dilutes any specific diversity criteria.
Concerns regarding the ability of current disclosure to truly promote gender
diversity can be illustrated through the case of Emcor (NYSE: EME). In 2008, not
unlike many of the other corporations in the study, Emcor had no reference to
diversity in its disclosure, nor any women on its board.176 All eight directors on
Emcor’s board were men.177 More striking, however, was that both in 2012 and 2016
Emcor disclosed under the SEC requirements that it considers diversity in its
nomination process but indicated that its focus is on obtaining a diversity of
professional expertise rather than a diversity of personal characteristics. 178 Not
surprisingly, Emcor failed to add any women to the board even while increasing the
total board size to ten directors.179
On the other hand, there are examples of companies that have made meaningful
changes to their nomination process as well as to their boardroom diversity disclosure
practices. One such example is Children’s Place (NSDQ: PLCE). Although female
directors in 2008 and 2012 only composed thirteen percent of Children’s Place’s
board,180 the percentage of the board held by female directors jumped to thirty-six
percent in 2016.181 These increases correlated with substantive changes in the
corporation’s policy towards board refreshment and diversity. In 2010, after the SEC
regulation took effect, Children’s Place added a consideration of gender as criteria
when nominating directors. 182 The company continued to improve its diversity
policies and, in 2016, provided a clear graphic to investors detailing the gender
composition of its board of directors.183 Further, Children’s Place specifically stated
that it seeks a board that has “an appropriate balance in terms of gender. Four of our
Board members are women.”184 This combination of clear visual information with
an explicit and measurable policy provides a blueprint for effective and tangible
gender diversity policies and disclosure practices.
More broadly, SEC disclosures reflect company policies that may be leading to
concrete outcomes when it comes to a company’s gender diversity. Indeed, the
connection between what a company discloses to investors and its gender diversity
ratio is not merely anecdotal. Examining the correlation between company
disclosures and the ratio of women on the board, this Article found a statistically
significant positive correlation. Specifically, as Table 13 below illustrates,
companies that specifically addressed gender in their diversity disclosure were also

176. Emcor Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 28, 2008).
177. See id.
178. See Emcor Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 18, 2012); Emcor
Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 20, 2016).
179. See Emcor Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 20, 2016).
180. See Children’s Place, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (May 20, 2008);
Children’s Place, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 24, 2012).
181. See Children’s Place, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 6, 2016).
182. See Children’s Place, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (May 18, 2010).
183. See Children’s Place, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 6, 2016).
184. Id. at 9.

BEY O ND TH E NU MB ER S

2019]

187

more likely to have higher ratio of females on their board,185 compared to companies
without a diversity policy or one that solely refers to difference in viewpoints.
Table 13: Regression Results

Type of Disclosure

Year

Percentage of Female
Directors
(correlation coefficient
(p-value))

Consider diversity at all

2008

0.213 (0.038)

Consider diversity at all

2012

-0.070 (0.489)

Consider diversity at all

2016

-0.031 (0.756)

Use gender as a factor in their decision-making

2008

0.043 (0.677)

Use gender as a factor in their decision-making

2012

0.286 (0.004)

Use gender as a factor in their decision-making

2016

0.352 (0.0003)

Define diversity to include diverse
perspectives/viewpoints

2008

0.230 (0.025)

Define diversity to include diverse
perspectives/viewpoints

2012

-0.05596334 (0.5842)

Define diversity to include diverse
perspectives/viewpoints

2016

0.05038617 (0.6222)

In sum, although the current state of diversity disclosures is reflective of the “soft”
regulatory approach, it also exemplifies the value of meaningful disclosure to
investors and the potential that a potent disclosure regime can provide.
C. The Flaws with Current Disclosures
The current regulatory approach, if truly intended to promote better gender
diversity disclosure, suffers from several flaws. 186 First, as others have noted, under
the current rules diversity is an open-ended concept.187 Boards can include anything
from gender and race to age and life experiences in defining diversity.188 In turn,
many companies comply with the letter of the regulation by defining diversity
broadly enough to incorporate any possible difference between people.189

185. Note that while the study found a correlation, it does not assert that there is a
causation. In other words, companies may be willing to disclose that they consider gender
because they have more women on the board.
186. The current regulatory approach has been criticized by several academics along
similar lines. See, e.g., DHIR, supra note 20, at 71–94; Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88,
at 874–75; Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 419.
187. See supra note 186.
188. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 162, at 68343–44.
189. See, e.g., Discovery Comm., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 30, 2016);
Six Flags Entm’t Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2016); Skechers U.S.A.,
Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 29, 2016); UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., Proxy
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Second, one of the major flaws of Regulation S-K noted by critics of the SEC
approach is that it only applies to boards who have diversity policies in place but
does not affirmatively require anything on behalf of boards without such policies.190
It has been suggested that one unintended consequence of this lack of an affirmative
policy is to disincentivize companies from creating a diversity policy. 191 A company
that creates a diversity policy must not only explain how the policy is enacted and its
results but also must describe how the policy works in practice. 192 While some may
argue that investors would nonetheless pressure companies into creating a policy,
until recently that has not been the case. Instead of increasing disclosure and
transparency, Regulation S-K has ironically restricted a company’s incentive to draft
diversity policies and increase the gender diversity of its board.
Third, beyond these effectively voluntary disclosures, the SEC requires no
additional information with respect to boardroom gender diversity. 193 This seems
inconsistent with the intention of Item 407(c) as explicitly stated by the SEC. 194
Investors expressed desire for information regarding diversity, 195 yet a company can
easily obscure its views on diversity. Thus, the requirements under Regulation S-K
and the information provided by companies fail to adequately disclose the desired
information.
When amending Regulation S-K in 2009, the SEC could have also included
requirements for diversity in Item 407(c)(2)(v), which requires the company to:
Describe any specific minimum qualifications that the nominating
committee believes must be met by a nominating committeerecommended nominee for a position on the registrant’s board of
directors, and describe any specific qualities or skills that the nominating
committee believes are necessary for one or more of the registrant’s
directors to possess.196
However, not only did the SEC not add diversity to Item 407(c)(2)(v), but the
SEC also explicitly excluded this Section from the diversity requirement 197 and, in
fact, included the diversity requirement directly after this Section.198 By specifically
stating that the above requirement did not apply to diversity, companies without
strong diversity policies have lacked an incentive to create one.

Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 22, 2016).
190. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 71–94; Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88, at 874–
75; Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 419.
191. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 251; Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88, at 874–75.
192. See SEC Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2018).
193. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407.
194. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communicating
Between Security Holders and Board of Directors Republication, Exchange Act Release Nos.
33-8340, 34-48825, 68 Fed. Reg. 69204, 69210–13 (Dec. 11, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274).
195. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 162, at 68343–44.
196. SEC Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2009).
197. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi).
198. See id.
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In 2016, then SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White described the role of the SEC in
gender diversity,199 within the traditional focus of the SEC on disclosure,200 stating
that “boards with diverse members function better and are correlated with better
company performance[, which] is precisely why investors have—and should have—
an interest in diversity disclosure about board members and nominees.”201 However,
as she has noted202 and as this Article demonstrates,203 company policies remain
vague. Further, very few companies have produced formal diversity policies, making
it hard to evaluate the effectiveness of diversity policies. 204 While Chairwoman
White noted that the SEC had researched and prepared a recommendation to require
companies to include in their proxy statements more meaningful board diversity
disclosures on their board members and nominees,205 no rule was ever formally
announced and the often-criticized Item 407(c)(2)(vi) remains investors’ only
regulatory means of ascertaining diversity information in the boardroom.
This regulatory failure has led investors such as State Street and BlackRock to
create comply-or-explain policies regarding gender diversity on the board, which are
tied to their votes for board elections. 206 In essence, these investors have effectively
initiated a gender diversity “threshold” for companies to meet in order to avoid
investor backlash.207 With the threat of upsetting these investors and opening the
gates for activist shareholders to court these votes, companies are likely to meet the
minimum requirements to comply with State Street and BlackRock’s demands.
****
The SEC’s amendment in 2009 was a move in the right direction. At a minimum,
it provided some information to investors regarding public companies’ diversity
policies and—as the data in Section B shows—it has clearly increased the number of
companies that disclosed their diversity policies. It may have also influenced some
companies to create diversity policies, which were previously absent, and it has

199. Mary Jo White, Focusing the Lens of Disclosure on Board Diversity, Non-GAAP, and
Sustainability, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 28, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/28/focusing-the-lens-of-disclosure-on-boarddiversity-non-gaap-and-sustainability [https://perma.cc/4ZV8-9PSG].
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra Section III.B.
204. White, supra note 199.
205. Id.
206. Sharo M. Atmeh, State Street Global Advisors Announces New Gender Diversity
Guidance, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://corpgov
.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/09/state-street-global-advisors-announces-new-gender-diversity
-guidance [https://perma.cc/AE6Y-772Z]; Scott Mlyn, BlackRock Vows New Pressure on
Climate, Board Diversity, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2017, 3:48 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03
/13/blackrock-vows-new-pressure-on-climate-board-diversity.html [https://perma.cc/W857
-5V7W].
207. See Atmeh, supra note 206; Mlyn, supra note 206. Granted, in many cases these
investors have left the door open for companies to rebuff this presumption through
engagement.
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directed attention to the issue of gender diversity. However, the flaws in the current
framework provide clear areas for potential reform that could make company
disclosures even more effective and valuable. In the next Part, the Article discusses
these potential reforms as part of a broader discussion of the policy implications
stemming from the Article’s findings regarding substantive gender diversity.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In Part II, the Article presented data on the composition and roles female directors
hold on S&P 1500 boards. The data show that differences between genders are
reflected not only in the ratio of women to men but also in their roles once elected to
the board. Furthermore, as with all averages, some companies perform better or
worse than average in gender parity—potentially leading to cases where the
quantitative parity of the board is not indicative of the substantive parity.
In other words, a company may have a higher than average number of women on
the board but may relegate them to less important positions on the board while
another company may have a lower number of women who are in key leadership
positions on the board. While this might seem an unlikely scenario, similar issues
exist in countries with mandated quotas.208
Furthermore, the composition of a company’s board is fluid. In any given year, a
company may lose or add a female director, therefore temporarily changing its
gender ratio. It does not mean, however, that such company changed (for better or
for worse) the level of substantive parity in its boardroom. These findings
demonstrate that substantive diversity is important, and that attention needs to be
paid to the differences in substantive diversity between men and women on boards.
Part III then examined the current SEC disclosure regime with respect to gender
diversity on boards. The Article demonstrated that companies provide very little
diversity information to their investors and discussed the current flaws in the
disclosure regime.
This Part aims to bring together these two strands—the importance of substantive
gender diversity and the deficiencies in the current disclosure regime—by discussing
the policy implications of these findings. First, regulators, investors, and companies
themselves should direct their attention to the question of substantive gender
diversity. If women bring value to boardrooms as companies and investors alike
believe, then ensuring that they are able to contribute equally must become an
integral part of the existing discourse. Second, the Article discusses the regulatory
implications and suggests a shift towards an enhanced disclosure regime that would
require companies to provide investors with both substantive and quantitative
measures of gender diversity with respect to the boardroom.

208. See, e.g., Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., Gender Parity on Boards Around the
World, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://corpgov
.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/05/gender-parity-on-boards-around-the-world
[https://perma.cc
/AY42-44KS] (describing the ability to focus on nomination without culture changes); Kunal
Sehgal, Indian Companies in Mad Rush to Find Women Board Members, CNN MONEY (Apr.
6, 2015, 10:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/06/investing/india-corporate-boards
-women [https://perma.cc/HS3L-8RB6].
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A. A Focus on Substantive Diversity
Prior studies, investor demands, and policy arguments have focused on
quantitative measures or a diversity threshold.209 That is, existing literature has
recommended that companies either meet some gender diversity threshold, disclose
their plans to reach some set number of female directors, or explain their failure to
do so.210 Though an increase in the absolute number of women on boards is clearly
important, and does provide more “diversity,” the findings in Part II illustrate the
need to augment this information with data on the specific roles that women perform
on any given board.
Granted, the appeal of the quantitative approach is understandable. Quantitative
measurements of diversity can provide a bird’s eye view of boardroom diversity.
They are easier to analyze and monitor. They are less murky or subject to
interpretation. Their strength is in their simplicity and straightforwardness. The focus
on increasing the ratio of women on boards also has undeniable benefits. Female
directors provide a new or different perspective on board decisions. 211 These
additional viewpoints provide a better opportunity for thoughtful business
decisions.212 A higher number of female directors could also help improve the
general gender diversity in the company.213 The more women on the board, the more
likely that the company promotes gender diversity from within.214
However, a sole focus on quantitative measurements misses the mark in assessing
and promoting true corporate board diversity. Corporations required to meet
quantitative diversity metrics can focus on achieving that metric without changing
the board’s culture or the board’s nomination procedures. 215 That is, a nominating
committee whose continued directorship is dependent on nominating an additional
woman (due to the threat of withhold campaigns by investors) will do just that.
However, it does not necessarily follow that the company will enact a policy to
include more women in their future searches or afford women, directly and
indirectly, with equal power within the boardroom or attempt to increase diversity
throughout the corporation.
Substantive measurements add color to the monochrome image that the number
and ratio of women provides us. They move away from solely asking companies to
meet a specific number of positions to be filled by gender diverse candidates. Instead,
it also allows for fluidity among companies to focus on the diversity aspects within
the boardroom work it, or its investors, finds important.

209.
210.
211.
212.

See EASTMAN ET AL., supra note 100.
See, e.g., DHIR, supra note 20; Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 109.
See Hong & Page, supra note 96.
Id.; see also Exclusive Interview: Empowering Board Evaluation and Refreshment,
EQUILAR (June 13, 2017), https://www.equilar.com/blogs/273-semler-brossy-board-diversity
-interview.html [https://perma.cc/C58G-BYTE] (explaining that “board representation leads
to more conversation and questioning that can lead to better answers and outcomes”).
213. EASTMAN ET AL., supra note 100, at 9; Vivian Hunt, Dennis Layton & Sara Prince,
Why Diversity Matters, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/business
-functions/organization/our-insights/why-diversity-matters [https://perma.cc/9MK6-LEKN].
214. EASTMAN ET AL., supra note 100, at 9.
215. See supra text accompanying note 208.
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Importantly, the inclusion of substantive measures does not take away from the
ability, and need, of boards to increase the number of women or diverse directors on
the board. Rather, it incentivizes these companies to increase gender diversity
quantitatively while also ensuring that ample attention is given to the substantive
gender parity within the boardroom. Because the absolute number of diverse
candidates on the board will still likely be dispositive towards any measure of
diversity, a company will still be incentivized to increase the number of women on
the board. However, it provides well-intentioned companies the opportunity to
organically grow their gender diversity. 216
Indeed, the data highlights the ties between these metrics. For example, women
are more likely to stay on the board for longer if the ratio of women on the board is
higher. Similarly, the presence of female directors in leadership roles is positively
correlated to longer tenure of the rest of the female directors on the same board.
As a result, investors should expect companies to do more than just add an
additional female to the board. For example, if the tenure of women is correlated
with their likelihood to take on leadership roles, as this Article finds, then investors
must scrutinize companies in which women’s tenure is low. Similarly, if the presence
of a woman in a leadership role can influence the willingness of women to stay
longer, then investors must account for that in their valuation of the company’s
gender diversity. If the fact that women are stretched too thin prevents them from
taking on leadership roles, then investors should consider asking companies to limit
the committee work that each director can do.
Companies themselves must also take a proactive approach. Companies must
examine their corporate culture and make sure that women are not stretched too thin
in their committee work, which could keep them from taking more active leadership
roles. Companies may also want to consider term limits for leadership roles, allowing
more women on the board to get an opportunity to serve in these roles. Companies
should also promote structured and clear opportunities for women to move up into
leadership roles, including mentorship.217
Public attention and regulatory emphasis should also take account of the
substantive measures of board diversity. A focus on substantive measures of board
diversity in addition to quantitative data on companies’ current and historic gender
diversity ratios would accomplish the core of gender diversity initiatives by asking a
simple, yet underaddressed, question: How do corporate policies and corporate
governance truly advance gender diversity?
B. Regulatory Reform
What regulatory intervention, if any, should be advocated for implementation in
the United States?218 Different jurisdictions around the world have approached the

216. For example, if a board does not find a female director within the next year or two but
attempts to cultivate diversity within the board by affording women stronger voice, it can
explain this process to investors, allowing more time to increase the actual number of women.
217. Joann S. Lublin, Boards Try Buddy System to Get Newcomers Up to Speed, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 18, 2017, 5:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boards-try-buddy-system-to-get
-newcomers-up-to-speed-1505769025 [https://perma.cc/WU7R-X57K].
218. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 71–94. Similarly, of a panel of five professors, researchers
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issue in diverse ways.219 First, some countries have placed hard quotas on board
composition, requiring either progressive representation by board size or simply
requiring some minimum number of female directors. 220 Second, some countries
have adopted softer laws otherwise known as comply-or-explain provisions.221 These
laws require boards to either meet a specific quota or state the affirmative reasons for
failing to comply with the law.222 Third, some countries (including the United States)
have placed minimal to no regulations regarding gender diversity. 223 As expected,
the fewer or softer the regulations, the lower the female board participation rate. 224
Though, generally speaking, tougher regulations lead to better female board
participation, other factors, including societal views towards gender, have a
significant impact on women’s board participation.225 Sweden, for example, has no
required quota for board participation, yet still has some of the highest parity between
the genders on boards.226 On the other hand, a country like India has a hard law
requiring at least one female on every board.227 However, in complying with the
regulation, 83.5% of Indian corporations have only one female on the board. 228
Further, only 59% of boards have an independent female director.229 Though both
show extreme examples of the spectrum, these countries prove the difficulty in
addressing board gender parity. Thus, gender diversity activists disagree as to
whether a quota enacts the meaningful change sought.
As a practical matter, quotas are an unlikely regulatory avenue in the United
States, as they would face legal hurdles230 and are unlikely to garner investor or

and administrators at the University of Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society
Symposium in Spring 2017, each panelist had either a different opinion on the necessity of
quotas, as well as the implementation thereof. Symposium, Women in the Boardroom: The
Social and Business Arguments that Challenge Executive Board Homogeneity, WIS. J.L.
GENDER & SOC’Y (2017).
219. See, e.g., Institutional S’holder Servs., supra note 208 (describing the different
approaches); DARREN ROSENBLUM & DARIA ROITHMAYR, THE CONFERENCE BD., THE EFFECT
OF GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARD DECISION-MAKING (2017).
220. Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., supra note 208; see also DHIR, supra note 20, at
71–94.
221. Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., supra note 208.
222. See, e.g., DHIR, supra note 20, at 240–48 (explaining the comply or explain model in
the context of gender diversity disclosure).
223. Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., supra note 208.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id.; News articles have documented the extreme examples of CEOs and chairmen
of boards complying with the law by hiring wives and relatives of board members. Much of
these articles suggest that a substantial number of these directorships have only been extended
to remain in compliance with the regulations and are not due to a belief of any added value.
E.g., Sehgal, supra note 208.
229. Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., supra note 208.
230. See supra text accompanying note 159; see also Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity:
Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1172–78 (2006).
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regulatory support.231 Scholars point to Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, in which the Supreme Court specifically rejected quotas in affirmative action
policies,232 as a likely legal hurdle to potential gender quota regulation in the United
States.233 Equally important, many of the changes in countries outside the United
States that have implemented quotas arose due to public pressure.234 However, even
adamant supporters of affirmative action policies in the United States strongly
disfavor mandatory quotas as a means for remediation, 235 further undermining a
focus on quotas as a remedy to the lack of gender diversity on the board.
Indeed, the SEC has mostly opted to use disclosure as a mean to address issues
related to corporate governance and social cause. 236 It is not surprising then, that in
the context of gender diversity in boardrooms, company disclosure has been the
natural first step of many regulatory reform proposals. 237 Moreover, even if gender
quotas were on the regulatory table, it is not clear that they would produce sufficient
focus on substantive diversity, as quotas are merely an enhanced version of the
existing quantitative focus.
The flaws in the current disclosure regime are therefore the logical starting point
of any regulatory reform. Recognizing the incongruity between the intention and
implementation of the regulation, the SEC under former Chairman Mary Jo White
made boardroom diversity a priority,238 and House Representatives have recently
urged the incoming SEC Chair to amend the diversity disclosure regime. 239 This
recent momentum could make a reconsideration of the current rules more likely,
although the current political landscape may present challenges to such reform.
Yet, the current calls for regulatory reform by investors and legislators are focused
on the addition of quantitative disclosure regarding the gender/race of directors. 240
While an important step in itself, the findings presented in this Article highlight that

231. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 78–82.
232. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
233. Magnier & Rosenblum, supra note 159, at 262–63.
234. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 109, at 893.
235. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking
Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1067 (1992).
236. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 599, 605 (2013) (“Disclosure is the sine qua non of the federal securities law.”); Hazen
& Broome, supra note 169, at 44–45; Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case for
Improving Director Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 38 (2017) (“[I]n recent years,
effective disclosure has taken on an increasingly pivotal role in corporate law. The SEC has
attempted to increase transparency for investors in many regulated areas and topics.”).
237. See, e.g., DHIR, supra note 20 at 94–98; Packel, supra note 85, at 220–21 (stating that
“despite criticisms and recognition of its limits, disclosure is still the most relied upon
mechanism because regulators can point to the fact that they are ‘doing something,’ and it
‘seems responsive and is relatively politically palatable’”).
238. Yin Wilczek, The SEC, Mary Jo White and Board Diversity, BLOOMBERG: CORP.
TRANSACTIONS BLOG (July 5, 2016), https://www.bna.com/sec-mary-jo-b57982076532
[https://perma.cc/HAT7-GC3H].
239. Letter from Carolyn B. Maloney & Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Members of Congress, to
Jay Clayton, Chair, SEC (May 30, 2017); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Friedman et al., supra note 11 (reviewing the suggestion by the New York
City Comptroller to revise the disclosure of diversity by companies).
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a review of the current standards must also consider substantive diversity
measurements. Therefore, if disclosure of gender diversity of boards is needed, as
investors and regulators alike have indicated, then a more complete overhaul of the
current diversity disclosure regime is warranted.
The findings in Section III.C also underscore the potential intrinsic value of
gender diversity disclosure. These findings suggest that the SEC’s disclosure regime,
if properly modified to address its current deficiencies, could be an appropriate
avenue for addressing diversity issues on boards, including incorporating the concept
of substantive diversity.
Consequently, the current calls for a disclosure reform should address two distinct
issues. First, the SEC must address the current definition of diversity to prevent
companies from strategically diluting it. Second, any added disclosure requirements
should include both quantitative and substantive measures of diversity.
1. The Definition of Diversity
Current SEC disclosure rules focus on whether and how a company considers
diversity. As developed above, the current legal framework fails to ensure even this
modest task. As discussed in Section III.C, one of the biggest flaws in diversity
disclosures is the ability of boards to self-define diversity.241 A company can define
diversity broadly so long as that definition is provided to investors. 242 Unfortunately,
this provides companies with the opportunity to include any and all potentially
diverse characteristics, therefore diluting the specific interest in gender diversity. For
example, companies may include “differences of viewpoint” as a measure of
diversity.243 If a company defines itself as diverse merely because it has “difference
of viewpoints,” then how is an investor expected to evaluate that board?
Permitting companies to define diversity allows the company to include all of the
aspects of diversity the company values. However, any regulation should still include
a specific set of gender diversity measures,244 for which each company must provide
data, in order to promote homogeneity amongst corporate diversity disclosures. By
requiring companies to define diversity clearly using a prerequisite list of clear and
measurable diversity factors, 245 investors can consciously vote for or against boards
meeting their expectation of diversity.

241. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 230–40 (addressing the issue of the current definition of
diversity).
242. See, e.g., United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 25 (Apr.
21, 2017).
243. See, e.g., AmTrust Fin. Servs., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 9 (Apr. 11,
2017); Axalta Coating Sys., Ltd., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 11 (Mar. 15, 2017);
Knight Transp., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 13 (Mar. 31, 2017); Urban Outfitters,
Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 9 (Apr. 3, 2017).
244. The focus of this Article is on gender diversity. Clearly, a case can be made for
including potentially other diversity areas, but this is not the purview of this Article.
245. For similar proposals, see DHIR, supra note 20, at 231–33; Packel, supra note 85, at
235–36.
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2. Adding a Substantive Gender Diversity Disclosure
The deficiencies in the current disclosure regime extend beyond the open-ended
treatment of diversity or the lack of effective disclosure by companies regarding their
approach to gender diversity on the board. Investors are also left in the dark regarding
the actual diversity in the boardroom. Recognizing the value in accounting for both
quantitative and substantive measures, this Article calls for the adoption of a
“Substantive Gender Diversity Disclosure” (SGDD) that would be required of each
company. The SGDD would require the company to provide a clear table, similar to
other disclosures such as director and executive compensation that summarizes many
of the measures highlighted above. The data should include the current ratio of
women to men on the board, the specific roles of women on the board compared to
men (with a specific breakdown of leadership positions), a comparative breakdown
of age and tenure, and any additional specific insight into how its board and its
corporate structure promote diversity.
Currently, most diversity statements included in proxy forms are drafted in
narrative form and remain vague, simply stating all diversity factors that are
potentially relevant into nominating directors.246 Diversity disclosures should, in
addition to the definition of diversity, clearly state how diverse a company is by using
both measurable metrics (quantitative and substantive) and company policies
promoting diversity within the boardroom and the company. The SGDD, as a
concept, is meant to carry this function.
Indeed, requiring companies to provide substantive disclosures of board diversity,
in addition to quantitative data on their current and historic gender diversity ratios,
would accomplish the core of gender diversity initiatives: Do we truly achieve gender
diversity?
An SEC amendment to its diversity rules that would potentially include the
suggested SGDD table carries several benefits. First, it would enable the adoption of
a unified SGDD that would allow shareholders to easily compare companies and
ensure that all companies are playing on the same playing field. It would also ensure
that changes to diversity on boards would occur more rapidly, as current shareholder
initiatives are only slowly beginning to gain steam. Finally, SEC led change will also
carry with it better enforcement of the new rules. Such institutional enforcement
would be lacking through other channels.
While the specific design of the SGDD should be crafted after a detailed
regulatory rule-making process, it is important to underscore that the SEC could
create a semi-flexible SGDD. By requiring disclosure regarding certain issues, but
allowing companies to experiment with policies, measurements, and other disclosed
metrics, this flexibility will allow for some organic growth and improvement.

246. See, e.g., Conn. Water Serv., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 4–5 (Mar. 30,
2016); Discovery Comm., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 10 (Apr. 5, 2017);
Essendant Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 15 (Apr. 13, 2016); Microsoft Corp., Proxy
Statement (Form DEF 14A) 13 (Oct. 18, 2016); Navient Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF
14A) 29 (Apr. 15, 2016); Six Flags Entm’t Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 8 (Mar.
22, 2016); Skechers U.S.A., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 17 (Apr. 29, 2016).
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C. Implementation Through Other Means
While a change to the current SEC rules would be the most straightforward route
for addressing gender diversity disclosure, the current SEC, under the new chair, may
be unwilling to take any regulatory steps in the near future. Therefore, companies
could hypothetically adopt a SGDD, or similar initiatives, on their own through two
other means. First, companies may voluntarily adopt improved disclosures based on
the mounting pressure from large investor groups. Second, SGDD could be
advocated via the shareholder proposal mechanism. While both are plausible
avenues, each suffers from drawbacks that would make them less effective than a
regulatory reform route.
1. Organic Growth
This Article began by showing the drastic change over the first few months of
2017 with regard to the view of diversity within the boardroom. 247 State Street and
BlackRock have specifically drawn a line in the sand regarding gender diversity:
promote more women or risk being voted out. 248 The impact will likely soon be felt
as companies actively look to add women onto the board to avoid an inevitable
negative vote. The benefits of this route are clear. Companies will organically move
towards more gender diversity with minimum regulatory burdens and without rapid
shocks.
However, while this strategy will likely continue to increase the number of
women in board directorships, it is not clear that it would lead to better company
disclosures. Investors (and very recently Congress) have been advocating for
improved quantitative disclosure for several years, with no success.249
2. Shareholder Proposals
Recent years have brought to the forefront the shareholder proposal 250 as an
effective tool for corporate governance changes. 251 The increasing importance of
proxy advisers coupled with the credible threat of “withhold” campaigns against
companies that ignore shareholder concerns have led corporations to pay closer
attention to precatory (nonbinding) shareholder proposals that receive significant
support by shareholders. The guidelines of ISS and Glass Lewis, the two largest and
most influential proxy advisory firms, require companies to act upon shareholder
resolutions that pass.252 If management ignores successful shareholder proposals,

247. See supra Introduction.
248. Atmeh, supra note 206; Mlyn, supra note 206.
249. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
250. According to Rule 14(a)(8), an individual shareholder can submit a shareholder
proposal if they continuously hold at least $2000, in market value, or 1% of the company’s
stock for at least one year prior to the shareholder meeting. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a–8(b) (2018).
251. See, e.g., Kastiel & Nili, supra note 65; Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the
Market for Corporate Influence, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2179 (2014).
252. See GLASS LEWIS & CO., PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2015 PROXY SEASON 1, 7–8, 28
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proxy advisory firms are likely to recommend against votes on individual directors
(or the entire board), and such directors could be subject to potential withhold
campaigns. In essence, such practice has transferred the so-called “precatory”
shareholder proposals into “quasi-binding” resolutions. This suggests that companies
nowadays face more severe sanctions if an unwelcomed shareholder proposal
passes.253
Indeed, the ability of shareholders to discipline board members through
withholding votes from directors’ nominees has become a major way for passive
shareholders to express their voice within the current regulatory framework and to
signal to the board that they are dissatisfied with its actions. In light of this new
reality, some companies prefer to negotiate and work with the proposing shareholder
to enact some change without having it go to a shareholder vote.254 If the shareholder
is successful with either method, then the company will likely change its corporate
governance to avoid future negative votes for failing to enact the proposal.
In the area of diversity disclosure, shareholders can submit proposals that are
individualized to each company or, more than likely, in the form of a standard
proposal. Shifting the aim of the shareholder-initiated proposals from the gender
ratios or quantitative disclosure to substantive disclosure carries an additional
benefit. It is a more modest request from the company and one that falls within the
core rights of shareholders. By merely requiring the company to provide meaningful
backward-looking information on diversity, the company is not necessarily required
to change anything other than providing an additional disclosure. It is likely that
requiring the disclosure will produce these changes as companies attempt to appease
shareholders through their disclosures. However, these changes do not directly arise
from the shareholder proposal but rather are indirect effects of transparency.
Not only will the less stringent requirements of the disclosure offer a better
opportunity for adoption, but the support of passive investors will also make these
proposals more likely to pass. With CalPERS and CalSTRS highly invested in many
passive funds,255 their support for gender diversity will flow through to the voters of

(2015),
http://www.glasslewis.com/assets/uploads/2013/12/2015_GUIDELINES_United
_States.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK8V-PBEK]; INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED
STATES SUMMARY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: 2015 BENCHMARK POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 13 (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy
/2015ussummaryvotingguidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7NM-4E33].
253. See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of Directors’
Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53
(2010) (providing empirical evidence that managers and directors who ignore majority vote
shareholder proposals are more likely to face sanctions in the labor market); Kobi Kastiel,
Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
101, 148–49 (2016) (discussing the mechanism behind the increasing disciplinary effect of
14a-8 shareholder proposals).
254. Stephen Joyce, Negotiations Lead to Fall in Proxy Access Proposals, BLOOMBERG
(June 30, 2016), https://www.bna.com/negotiations-lead-fall-n57982076332 [https://
perma.cc/JL6Q-TNPB] (reporting that “an increasing number of companies negotiating
settlements with shareholders led to a material decrease in the number of shareholder proposals
seeking proxy access in 2016”).
255. See State Street Global Advisors Launches Gender Diversity ETF to Help Investors
Seek a Return on Gender Diversity, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 7, 2016, 8:58 AM), https://www
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these passive funds. Thus, a shareholder proposal supporting gender diversity is
likely to be viewed and voted positively by these funds. In turn, companies will likely
be more inclined to adopt shareholder proposals before shareholder vote knowing
the likelihood of passive fund support is high.
However, shareholders have yet to focus on the substantive aspect of diversity,
opting to focus on the more tangible quantitative issue. Indeed, while shareholders
are currently submitting proposals for gender diversity initiatives, 256 most of these
proposals suggest a company establish practices for identifying and adding female
board directors.257 However, the focus in these proposals is still more in the
nomination process rather than the roles directors take within the board. 258
Moreover, the shareholder proposal route has yet to garner sufficient support.
Gender diversity proposals have struggled to attain the requisite votes to put the
proposal into action,259 partially since some of the largest shareholders of companies
routinely withhold votes on social issues, as they prefer to engage directly with the
company.260 In 2016, only one in nine of such proposals received the votes necessary
to pass.261 However, these numbers do not account for submitted proposals that were
settled prior to vote.262 It is possible that some of these proposals were negotiated on

.businesswire.com/news/home/20160307005890/en/State-Street-Global-Advisors-Launches
-Gender-Diversity [https://perma.cc/7ZAM-RC2Q] (“SSGA was inspired to develop the
Index by [CalSTRS] efforts to move the needle on gender diversity in corporate America,
especially for women in leadership positions.”).
256. See Green & Chasan, supra note 62; Katz & McIntosh, supra note 66.
257. For example, Discovery Communications received the following proposal in 2016:
Shareholders request that the Board of Directors prepare a report by September
2016, at reasonable expense and omitting proprietary information, on steps
Discovery Communications is taking to foster greater diversity on the Board over
time including but not limited to the following: 1. The inclusion of women and
minority candidates in every pool from which Board nominees are chosen and
our company’s plan to advance Board diversity; 2. An assessment of challenges
experienced and progress achieved.
Discovery Comm., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 76 (Mar. 30, 2016). In 2017,
Discovery then received the following proposal:
Shareholders request that the Board of Directors of Discovery Communications
adopt a policy for improving board diversity (the “Policy”) requiring that the
initial list of candidates from which new management-supported director
nominees are chosen (the “Initial List”) by the Nominating and Corporate
Governance Committee should include (but need not be limited to) qualified
woman and minority candidates. The Policy should provide that any third-party
consultant asked to furnish an Initial List will be asked to include such
candidates.
Discovery Comm., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 89 (Apr. 5, 2017).
258. See, e.g., Discovery Comm., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 6 (Apr. 5, 2017).
259. See Green & Chasan, supra note 62; Katz & McIntosh, supra note 66.
260. See, e.g., Policies and Guidelines: Environmental and Social Matters, VANGUARD,
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/policies-and-guidelines [https://perma.cc
/TJF2-FHSQ] (noting the differences amongst investors and the difficulty to support the views
amongst these investors).
261. See Green & Chasan, supra note 62; Katz & McIntosh, supra note 66.
262. Joyce, supra note 254.
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or completely enacted by the company before the shareholder vote and therefore
never had an opportunity to be voted on.
D. Potential Objections
This Section considers and responds to several possible objections to the proposed
disclosure reforms and the focus on substantive disclosure.
1. “Substantive Murkiness”
On its face, substantive diversity disclosures will make it more difficult for
investors to determine whether a company has sufficiently increased its diversity.
Quantitative measures are simple. A company reaches a predefined percentage
threshold or some absolute number and is consequently determined to be sufficiently
diverse. Therefore, the murkiness that a focus on a substantive disclosure may create
might detract from such efforts.
However, this argument misses the mark on several fronts. First, as discussed
above, the design of the substantive disclosure can establish easy, quantifiable
parameters such as tenure, lead roles, committee chairs, and more. These quantifiable
measures would allow for more clarity into the substantive parity in the boardroom,
while also providing clear benchmarks of comparison. Second, the substantive
disclosures are not mutually exclusive with the general push for more diversity in the
board nomination process. To the contrary, the suggested SGDD would include the
quantitative data. The addition of the substantive data may incentivize companies to
take additional substantial steps to prove they have met the requisite diversity.
2. Overinclusiveness
Some critics may argue that current disclosure requirements are sufficient and that
any additional disclosures would lead to overinclusiveness and to overloading
investors with information. Further, to counter the possible concerns of investors,
companies may provide information that is clearly immaterial, placing unnecessary
costs on the company and for investors who would need to comb through this
information.
However, this argument is also lacking in several aspects. First, forcing the board
to be overinclusive and shining light on substantive diversity disclosure allows for a
better assessment of the board’s substantive diversity. Second, shareholders are more
than capable of properly digesting this information with the help of sophisticated
investors and proxy advisers. Third, the general trend in current corporate
governance is for more information rather than less. 263 There is no reason to deviate
from this approach when it comes to diversity.

263. Mary Jo White, Statement at an Open Meeting on Regulation S-K Concept Release,
SEC (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-statement-1-041316.html
[https://perma.cc/2DHR-GG98] (highlighting the role and importance of improved and more
detailed disclosures to shareholders).
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3. Questionable Diversity Practices Will Persist
A third potential objection is that changing disclosure requirements will not cure
the problem of substantive parity in the boardroom. Companies may react by better
camouflaging their board practices, and some investors will look differently at
different substantive markers, placing different “diversity scores” for each company.
However, the proposed changes are designed to increase investor transparency
rather than force substantive parity on companies. A focus on substantive factors in
addition to the quantitative ratios would better educate investors of their company’s
board’s true diversity. In turn, better investor awareness to both quantitative and
substantive aspects of diversity might allow each company to strike its own optimal
diversity balance, both in terms of quantity and roles that women take on the board.
4. Private Ordering
If substantive disclosure is important, and value enhancing, then supporters of the
market view could ask why we do not see companies adopt it without regulatory
intervention. There are several reasons, however, to be skeptical of reliance on the
market alone to drive these changes. First, companies lack the incentive to provide
this information to shareholders, as it may reveal the true diversity gap on the board,
even where the number of women directors is relatively high. Second, while
shareholders could value the substantive aspect of diversity, focusing on the
quantitative aspect has seemed to be the focus of their initiatives. As explained above,
some of it is a strategic focus on more observable issues, but this Article contends
that some of it is also due to the lack of current attention to the roles women take in
the boardroom after being elected. Finally, market movement is already happening,
but it is inherently slow. The Article highlighted two “private ordering” avenues
through which we may see a move towards substantive diversity disclosure.
However, the Article also highlighted the benefits that a centralized regulatory
intervention may provide, one that the market is unlikely to produce.
CONCLUSION
The current SEC regulatory framework fails to adequately disclose to investors
the substantive representation of female directors on the board or even provide the
ratio of women on the board. While previous studies have introduced evidence that
social and economic reasons exist for increasing gender diversity, many companies
have lagged behind in introducing policies aimed at searching for and cultivating
gender diversity. The key argument developed in this Article is that while a focus on
the number of women on boards is important and a central first step in the quest for
true gender parity, it cannot be the only lens through which gender diversity is
examined. Rather, investors and boards should also focus on a substantive disclosure
of female boardroom participation.
Substantive disclosures complement the quantitative data in that they provide a
more nuanced account of the substantive diversity in the boardroom, while also
providing companies with the ability and flexibility to draft policies and propose
corporate changes applicable to their situation. Rather than encouraging companies
to meet some specific gender diversity metric, companies will be incentivized to
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delve deeper into gender diversity and disclose their method for doing so. This
provides investors with the possibility of meaningful change they seek and improves
transparency into the corporate governance procedures of leading companies.
Coupled with prior studies indicating positive correlations between gender diversity
and company performance, increased disclosure could provide positive benefits to
corporate America and society at large.
Equally important, recognizing the import of substantive gender diversity
necessitates further research into the intraboard dynamics. This Article has used
available data to examine several disparities between the genders. However, our
understanding of substantive diversity would greatly benefit from additional data
points on the respective roles that the genders take in the boardroom.
The recent focus on board gender equity has started to move the needle, but gender
equity is still sorely missing from most public companies in the United States. The
substantive and leadership gaps between the genders on public companies’ boards
must shift gender diversity advocates away from a micro-focus on numbers. The past
year proved that change is possible. Now, investors and regulators must turn their
attention beyond the numbers to the systematic disparities between women and men
on boards. If women are not moving into positions of power on boards or are
otherwise treated differently on boards, we need to know why, and we need to
understand the cost.

